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Abstract 
 
Play is a fundamental experience embedded within human culture.  We all play in 
some perceptible manner that provides our lives with meaning we don’t ordinarily 
feel from other pursuits that are means-ended.  Sport philosophers have depended 
upon the seminal theories of Huizinga and Caillois to shape their constraints on the 
play world.  Huizinga’s and Caillois’ definition both use formal analysis to protect 
the play sphere however, their theories fail in providing justifiable reason to protect 
the play sphere and the meaning it has.  I propose that understanding play from the 
perspective of existentialism provides a better way to understand its meaning and 
truly understand how it shapes the understanding of play, games, and sports with 
the field of the philosophy of sport.  
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Chapter 1: Towards Lusory Introspection 
 
1.1 Introduction  
  
At some point in the long history of humanity’s quotidian life, games and sports 
were conceived forever altering our world.  The creation of games and sports may 
have delivered us from an exclusively functionalist outlook of humanity, thus 
evolving our position towards concepts more intrinsically meaningful such as 
‘play.’1  At what point games and sports were conceived, we cannot be entirely sure, 
but throughout their extensive genealogy their link to the phenomenological 
concept of ‘play’ appears undeniable. The occurrence of play has permeated all of 
human history; no civilization has ever been free of its influence.2  Sports and games 
are the most readily identifiable play forms known to our society, even carving out a 
special space to be celebrated as such.  The exact definitions of play, games, and 
sports have been unclear.  Furthermore, the relationship amongst the combined trio 
can be especially difficult to grasp.  Modern sports and games are celebrated, not the 
least because they contain important human significance through their connection 
with the play phenomenon, but they appear to be indistinguishable from one 
another at times.   The diverse natures and structures of games, sports, and play 
must be defined to develop substantiated philosophical theories concerning the 
                                                        
1 The quotation marks a semantic shift from the word’s ordinary usage, indicating a 
conceptual or theoretical meaning different from conventional usage. 
2 Klaus Meier, “An Affair of Flutes: An Appreciation of Play,” Journal of Philosophy of 
Sport, VII (1980): p. 24.   
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interrelationships amongst these three concepts, in order to better identify meaning 
inherent to the activities.3 
Play, games, and sports are valued human concepts that are interrelated; 
however, play is the constant that precedes the two social constructions of games 
and sports, whose definitions, or purpose, have yet to fully crystalize.  Bernard Suits 
describes games and sports as “enterprises or institutions” and play, game, and 
sport in combination as the “tricky triad.”4  The cumulative group name derives 
from the similarities each individual concept shares with the others, creating 
difficulty in precisely defining them as distinct and independent concepts, especially 
games and sport.  The play element complicates the triad because it can be an 
integral factor to the two remaining concepts, i.e. ‘game’ and ‘sport,’ that are quite 
similar.  With concepts so ill-defined, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint what a 
person is doing exactly, when he/she is engaged in sport or a game, and the 
significance these actions can have.  Are they experiencing all three elements of the 
tricky triad simultaneously, or do they exist in a progressive manner where they can 
be subsumed sequentially in a sort of continuum?  The quest in philosophy of sport, 
to gain further understanding of these relationships is predicated upon formulating 
an exact philosophical definition of each component of the tricky triad.  This quest 
may clarify the nebulous relationship between the three concepts, but also 
                                                        
3 Klaus Meier, “Triad Trickery: Playing With Sport and Games,” Journal of Philosophy 
of Sport, XV (1988): p. 11.   
4 Bernard Suits, “Tricky Triad: Games, Play, and Sport,” Journal of Philosophy of 
Sport, XV (1988): p. 1.   
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determines the boundary for creating a specified scope delimiting each component 
to its perceived essence.   
Play is a fundamental experience embedded in human culture.  We all play in 
some perceptible manner or another, but often it occurs without any sort of 
recognition.  Most of the time, we limit our understanding of play to the world of 
childish folly, often overlooking its presence in other aspects of our lives 
traditionally thought to be exclusively serious.  It even can also be overlooked in 
sports and games of contemporary culture, with such high stakes attached to 
athletic pursuit.  Sports and games represent the most obvious link to simple ‘play’ 
forms, but with the added complexity introduced by varying degrees of human 
sophistication.  They present a human constructed lens for us to discover life 
unfettered by our penchant towards the mundane pursuits of societal means-ended 
functioning, in other words, ‘work.’  By playing these human constructions, we can 
realize complete freedom from the societal circumstances that impose an attitude of 
work that is highly regimented.  I believe the structure of sports and games are 
designed to safeguard the purity of play in a sacred place that is held distinct from 
the antithetical world of means-ended pursuits.  The sport philosopher, Klaus Meier 
emphasizes the sanctity of play, while divorcing it from the world of means-ended 
conduct.     
Play is not a means to external ends or purposes; it does not further survival, 
sustenance, pragmatic, or materialistic interests.  It is process rather than product 
oriented.  The interest in play is the pursuit of internal values and ends; the reward 
is in the act.  Thus, the prize of play is play itself.5   
 
                                                        
5 Klaus Meier, “An Affair of Flutes: An Appreciation of Play,” Journal of Philosophy of 
Sport, VII (1980): p. 25.   
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Experiencing play is an intrinsic choice by the sport player done simply for 
the sake of itself and no other.  Nevertheless, humanity’s infatuation with sport 
presents a remarkable paradox, since, in most cases, sports involve activities 
arbitrarily constructed, for no apparent external purpose related to the teleological 
utility of enlightened practices. Sports are prized greatly within culture because they 
symbolize a source of freedom that can’t be experienced during traditional means-
ended activity.  They require a wholly different mental attitude that one can only 
carry intrinsically, separating it from the ordinary world we normally operate in.  
Meier further suggests, “Any pragmatic culture so heavily oriented toward 
productive, utilitarian enterprises will view the adult player as irresponsible, and 
will tolerate play only with suspicion, guarded restraint, and constraints.”6  Sure 
enough, the means-ended faction suspicious of play described above by Meier has 
co-opted mainstream sport.  The far-reaching influence of this idea of human 
purpose has fundamentally perverted our collective attitudes towards ‘playing’ 
sport.  Today, all levels of sport are largely driven by outcomes, results, and benefits.  
Inevitably this has caused us to lose our way in such a meaningful and honorable 
endeavor.  I intend on producing a vigorous philosophical defense of play in order to 
once again recognize the value of our play in the face of a fast changing landscape for 
sport.            
 
 
                                                        
6 Klaus Meier, “An Affair of Flutes: An Appreciation of Play,” Journal of Philosophy of 
Sport, VII (1980): p. 27.  
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1.2 Relative Value of Play in all its Manifestations within 
Society  
Klaus Meier, in “An Affair of Flutes” best describes the value of play for the purposes 
of this study.  Humanity is traditionally governed by a means-ended approach to all 
goal-oriented tasks due of our unique level of reasoning.  In Western culture, the 
reign of the ideology of work gives us highly limited permission to be useless.7  From 
the start of humanity’s new beginning in the New World, harsh cruelties have 
necessitated a means-ended outlook simply for survival. Puritan settlers conceived 
the attitude described as the ‘Protestant work ethic’ that still persists today.8  
Subsequent generations who subscribe to this work ethic, believe hardworking 
people are destined for salvation, while the slothful will be condemned to 
damnation.  After all, during the beginning of European settlement of the New World 
humans lived a barren existence.  Now we have reshaped the world to reflect our 
ingenuity and self-determination through tireless work ensuring our own destiny.  
Incrementally, the global society has progressed to this point through a continuous 
work mentality shaped by the Protestant work ethic.  The reason for crafting the 
world in this way, is that it lends to the idea that our collective existence has some 
sort of greater purpose other than becoming a prisoner of one’s imprudent 
indulgence in all things pro tem; otherwise what deeper meaning could humanity 
experience beyond the emptiness of a fleeting thrill?  Meier suggests that part of 
human identity is shaped through productivity and work.    
                                                        
7 Meier, “An Affair of Flutes,” p. 25 
8 Ibid p. 25 
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The construction of a secular version of this code contributed to the 
increasing acceptance of the assumption that man’s expectations and 
orientation should be framed and nurtured under the category of 
work and the understanding that he literally manufactures his 
identity and dignity by his fabrications as a functional entity in the 
work world.9   
 
Humanity’s elevated level of reasoning, in addition to the combination of 
social and self-awareness, might lead one to surmise that our purpose revolves 
around the creation and advancement of a uniform social veneer used to promote 
greater levels of productivity, which is best described as civilization.  Within a 
civilized society, various milestones mark the gradual means-ended progression of 
our species within the practices of politics, architecture, literature, etc. that further 
distance us from the state of nature forewarned by Hobbes.  All of these pursuits 
have a practical application that contributes incrementally to the edifice of 
civilization in a rather noticeable way.  In spite of this work attitude employed in 
day-to-day contemporary civilized life, games and sports run contrary to the 
principled and deliberate means-ended approach.  Furthermore, Meier asserts that 
play allows man to truly exist within the world devoid of the weight and 
consequence of means-ended thought.     
Play may be heralded as a singularly fulfilled, liberating experience, 
through which man opens doors normally closed, alters his habitual 
modes of perception, refuses categorically to tolerate premature and 
limiting closures, views naked simplicity of the world and entities 
within it, and inaugurates processes and actions of creative and 
novel transformation.10 
 
  If games and sport are truly linked to whimsical play, they pose a deep-
seated contradiction to our purpose within a purposeful societal structure.  Yet, 
                                                        
9 Meier, “An Affair of Flutes,” p. 26.  
10 Ibid p.31. 
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oddly, game and sport completely and utterly captivate a significant space within 
the civilized socio-cultural sphere.  Games and sports are dedicated to being carried 
out simply for their own sake and not any other, while taking place in a world far 
removed from the one in which we normally exist. Despite the fact that these 
diversions don’t add any special value to ordinary civilized culture, they are 
celebrated and cherished as institutions in their own right.  Sport as an institution, 
isn’t in keeping with the cultural treasures produced by humanity’s typical means-
ended approach.  It is my belief that such means-ended cultural treasures are 
celebrated because they embody the ideals central to that specific practice’s 
functional utility while proving to be aesthetically pleasing in a way that is timeless.  
However, when sport is played in a genuine manner, it possesses similar, if not 
equal or greater, significance while never approaching the same tangible utility of 
practices with definite consequences.  Coincidentally, watching skilled athletes 
participating in sport is aesthetically pleasing, and it is no wonder that we have 
come to find value in it as spectacle first and foremost.  Playing sport is one of the 
greatest paradoxes inherent to our culture when juxtaposed with work mentality as 
outlined by Meier in “The Affair of Flutes,” which I also support.  I seek to probe 
further into Meier’s accurate assessment of play and work.  Play and work have 
existed since the point of humanity’s beginning, but their recent intersection within 
newly-treasured contrived play activities such as sports, and games presents an 
especially peculiar morass, which obscures the timeless meaning inherent to such a 
simple pursuit.      
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1.3 The Play Paradox 
For most theories on play, in particular, those utilized in this study by Huizinga, 
Caillois, Suits, and Meier, it quickly becomes apparent that games and sports don’t 
really matter in terms of actual consequence because they are dedicated to a world 
apart.  Relative to the means-ended approach that promotes calculated and 
considered decisions in support of the ordinary attitude, sustained play cannot exist 
without freedom from oppressive real world conditions.  Sustained play could be 
describe as informal or formal but extending beyond a fleeting moment.  Therefore, 
a clear distinction forms between humanity’s practical focus and the superfluous 
nature of play.  Nonetheless, spirited competition is the characteristic most common 
to the participants in games and sports, essentially conducting themselves as if it 
were the only matter of any importance within the span of that moment.  For some, 
sports do matter, and such intense focus on the frivolous appears to some others, to 
be a gross misunderstanding of one’s priorities.  This phenomena is not unique to 
frolicking youth unconcerned with the burden of responsibility, but is shared by the 
non-varsity college student, the weekend bowler, the middle-aged person training 
simply to attempt to complete a marathon, and even the senior citizen playing 
checkers.  Sports and games are a significant aspect of the lives of all sorts of people, 
because we love to revel in the play phenomenon.  All of the activities above share 
similar characteristics but certainly are not identical.  These opportunities are 
normally considered pursuits that provide peoples’ lives with significant meaning.  
Following the player’s participation a peculiar feeling of fulfillment engulfs them; 
however, such feelings of fulfillment typically require accomplishment.  Each contest 
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has a winner and a loser.  Most participants don’t win the tournaments they are 
involved in.  They could be viewed as having squandered precious time they could 
have used to go about the business of accomplishing more practical endeavors 
instrumental to humanity’s continued means-ended progression.  Despite the 
discord between the deep meaningfulness of a player’s participation and the 
activity’s purposelessness, the meaning of the moment persists long after its end, 
enduring within the player.  Sports can’t be evaluated using the same cost-benefit 
criteria traditionally used to determine material value in our lives, the existential 
meaning of game-play experienced by the true player is just too great.  Ultimately, 
the irony of the true player signifies a paradox bordering upon the absurd.   
For the overwhelming minority, their participation in sport begets external 
value when classified as a professional.   They retain the single tangible link 
connecting games and sport to the ordinary means-ended functioning world.  The 
majority of people engage in games and sports without receiving extrinsic rewards 
as a result of their efforts.  With this being the case, from a logical perspective, our 
behavior in activities so absurd is quite curious, especially upon considering that 
our human faculties are guided by purposive action.  Why engage in sport if you are 
not guaranteed to be compensated like you ordinarily would for achieving other 
goal-oriented activity?  Are playing games and sports for their own sake simply a 
waste of time?  It all seems illogical and confounding when considering our 
normative means-ended outlook.  Therefore, such questions warrant closer scrutiny 
of the lasting existential meaning the player experiences while at play.  This poses a 
fundamental contrast with the underlying structural difference of contemporary 
10 
 
elite/professional sports.  These pursuits seemingly forsake the play mentality in 
sports, modifying it to a novel work approach.  It is my assertion that when 
contemporary sport follows this paradigm it creates an unintended moral morass 
due to the player’s attitudinal perversion.  Within the structure of contemporary 
hyper-competitive sport, it ceases to retain any sort of personal meaning when 
conducted ad libitum.  Contemporary sport is no longer self-fulfilling from a 
standpoint of choosing sport as mechanism to find meaning or purpose in one’s life.  
The attitude of work, and means-ended calculation, has infiltrated contemporary 
sport imposing an external purpose that our society believes is inherent to 
humanity, into something that has no greater purpose beyond itself.   
This critical review can make one question and reflect back to the countless 
blocks of time spent playing these seemingly foolish games we have constructed.  
Have we wasted the better part of our youth by not working?  In retrospect my 
participation in sports seems illogical when I consider the alternate opportunities 
along other paths I declined to explore.  Nevertheless, I can’t deny the meaningful 
memories had memories when I scored my first touchdown, or every time I 
experience a satisfying exchange of a well-played tennis rally, or when I dunked the 
basketball for the first time during the course of a game.11  Equally important, are 
the lasting memories of lessons learned following bitter failure.  With each memory 
my heart swells with pride, overriding the logical faculties that tell me what I’m 
doing isn’t that important in the grand scheme of things.  The meaningfulness 
experienced by the player speaks to the existential component of games and sport 
                                                        
11 As a caveat, part of this essay will be through an interpretation of the author’s 
own experience ‘playing.’ 
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that connect us all.  As Albert Camus perfectly encapsulated sport’s 
universalizability, “After many years during which I saw many things, what I know 
most surely about morality and the duty of man I owe to sport.”12 
 
1.4 Meaning through the Existential View 
Some forms of existential absurdum suggest we live in a purposeless, chaotic 
universe, which is inherently meaningless.13  According to the existential philosophy 
of Albert Camus, the absurd dictates that no meaning can be found in the world 
beyond the individual meaning we provide it.  For meaning to come to pass, the 
existential philosophy of Sartre states that a human agent’s, “existence precedes 
essence.”14  Sartre’s maxim diverges from the ancient Greek philosophy of Aristotle 
who believed a thing’s essence translated to its intended purpose.  It has been from 
Aristotle’s function argument where our Western attitudes about humanity and 
purpose were originally formed.15  Sartre’s famous assertion is essentially proposing 
that human beings begin from a point similar to John Locke’s16 concept of tabula 
                                                        
12 Brian Cronin, “Stupid, Absurd Sports,” The Harvard Crimson. (2012, April 19th). 
 Retrieved from http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2012/4/19/harvard-sports-
are-stupid/ 
13 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Albert Camus,” Last Updated (2011, Oct 
27th). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/camus/  
14 Walter Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. (New York: Meridian 
Books, 1956), p. 289. 
15 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. William David Ross  (Oxford: University 
Press, 2009) p. 10  
16 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  (Toronto: Penguin 
Books Ltd, 1997)  
12 
 
rasa.17  This leads to the suggestion that humanity simply exists prior to any 
concepts of values or ethics.  Therefore the position is that humanity can’t have 
altruistic values or universal ethics that are not acquired or developed e.g. (The Lord 
of the Flies.)18 With no accepted criteria of what constitutes a human being’s 
essence, no definition exists as to what it means to be human.  It is then incumbent 
upon every individual to fulfill their existence by choosing their own meaningful 
essence.  Accordingly, a human being realizes their essence by the conscious choices 
they make in order to shape concepts like values and ethics. On this account, it is 
solely through the process of living that one defines one's self.  However, exclusively 
dedicating oneself to becoming the greatest ball-player misses the point of ‘playing.’  
Play should be considered an excellent compliment, but shaping the entirety of one’s 
essence around game seems to be a gross misunderstanding of the concept’s trivial 
nature.  The aforementioned meaning experienced by the player derives from the 
freedom to determine their essence by the means of their most basic form of 
existence in the form of their own body.  To apply this concept to play, the meaning 
felt by the player revolves around choice and freedom, concepts epitomizing the 
idea of existence.  To use one’s body and mind only in a way to seek some further 
instrumental good, is in itself a choice of how to live life.  Further, on this account, 
the genuine player’s choice is superior to the instrumental participant because the 
choice is made for a good determined by one’s self and not by, or for, any external 
factor.  
                                                        
17 Latin phrase, which translates to, scraped tablet, which implies blank slate 
especially when referring to birth or infancy. 
18 William Golding, The Lord of the Flies.  (Great Britain: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1954) 
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 In other words, the game-player’s play possesses self-defining meaning that 
is not conditional to the player’s surroundings, but exists unconditionally in their 
heart.  If we are to accept this as being true, then it becomes crucial to examine the 
constitution of sports, games, and play to understand what we are truly doing.     
 
1.5 Importance of ‘Playing’ Sport  
In order to truly pinpoint the essence of sports and games, the appropriate point of 
entry into philosophy of sport involves questions about the nature of sport and its 
relation to the concept of play that precedes it.19  For, when we examine the 
examples cited above, what are they doing if there isn’t a teleological purpose to 
sport?  Normally games are considered as being reserved for childish folly, but the 
seriousness attributed to sports by the spirited player proves this to be not always 
accurate.  ‘Play’ has been identified as a central pillar to the field of research in sport 
philosophy.  Beginning with Johan Huizanga’s Homo Ludens: a Study of the Play 
Element in Culture, sport philosophers have been forced to define the practice of 
games and sports, while recognizing they are grounded within the greater domain of 
play.  Huizinga unearths elements of play within all facets of human culture, which 
leads him to conclude that play is primary to cultural development, especially 
                                                        
19 Randolph Feezell, Sport, Play, and Ethical Reflection.  (University of Illinois Press, 
Urbana and Chicago, 2004) p. 4.  
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sports.  Play transcends that of which is purely physical or purely biological activity, 
carrying out a significant function, which suggests there is some sense to it.20   
   In Western Culture, the inception of the analysis of ‘play’ begins with 
Huizinga’s demonstration of its centrality to the development of culture.  ‘Play’ 
theory has been one of the anchors sport philosophers use in defining and 
distinguishing between the activities of mere play, games, and sport.  One goal was 
that with a clear understanding of this interrelationship they could provide a 
coherent answer to the question of what constitutes sport?  Thereby precisely 
delimiting what sport is, so it can be distinguished from the idea of a game, and 
account for the continuing influence of play within sport.  Play in human culture has 
an undeniable relation to sport and games, but poses conceptual problems with the 
paradigm used to understand our contemporary sporting environment.  Sport is 
multi-faceted and ever changing, proven by its wide range from tee-ball leagues for 
children, to ultra competitive professional sports leagues.  Certainly, the 
participation of Ken Griffey Jr. differs from that of little Suzy participating in 
afterschool tee-ball.  In the examples cited above, both could chose to play for the 
simple pleasure gained, but their respective play environments drastically differ 
because of the differences in our contemporary sporting range.  Our modern gaming 
and sporting environment now champion professional performances and various 
other compensation in some fashion, as the predominate idea of these derivative 
play forms.  Contemporary sports have etched a special place in our culture of which 
most are quite fond.  As a result, fanatical attitudes have matured into the sport 
                                                        
20 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture.  (Hunt, 
Barnard and Co., LTD: London and Axlebury, 1944) p. 4.  
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industrial complex that has fused commercialism with sport, producing better 
athletic theatre than yesteryear.  What is most ironic about this combination of 
sport and commercialism is the linkage of ordinary means-ended approach to the 
whimsical and playful sport concept bereft of any ordinary desires like money.  
Right or wrong, athletic performance was inevitably going to be harnessed for 
commercial gain because sport’s beauty is so obvious to onlookers familiar and 
ignorant alike.  The contemporary sporting structure again begs the question of 
definition and relation.  Modern sport’s tenuous link to play seems especially 
pronounced nowadays.  Huizinga suggests the following toward the end of Homo 
Ludens when discussing the death of play. 
In the case of contemporary sport we have an activity nominally 
known as play but raised to such a pitch of technical organization 
and scientific thoroughness that the real play-spirit is threatened 
with extinction.21  
 
  The relationship play has to contemporary sport has been fundamentally 
perverted due to its association with work-like approaches.  A huge shift has 
occurred in the way we understand sport from the play mentality.  No longer is play 
done for its own sake.  Sport is primarily practiced and performed in a manner 
resembling play, but is no longer truly free without a genuine play attitude.  Sport 
was once considered to be a fatuous undertaking reserved for youth.  However this 
idea has flipped on its head and our understanding of sport is being shaped from the 
perverted and commodified contemporary form, essentially ceasing as play.  The 
attitude guiding participation is virtually unrelated to the lusory mentality that 
resembles the simplest forms of play.  Freedom and choice are so crucial to play, 
                                                        
21 Huizinga, p. 199. 
16 
 
however, these concepts can only add to the self-meaning the true player 
experiences, if contemporary sport is consciously chosen as a pursuit independent 
of any other good, which for the most part, it appears not to be.  The word amateur 
is primarily used to describe such a person, but as Schneider describes the definition 
of “no paid sport” presents logical troubles.22  Schneider proposes a positive 
definition of amateurism that supports the autotelic and playful qualities in favor of 
means-ended conduct typically exhibited in high performance sport.        
1.6 Methodology   
One major concern of this study is the lusory introspection of the athlete.  This will 
be achieved by examining three aspects of ‘play’ within sport philosophy.  First, the 
exact progression of our understanding of ‘play’ within the field sport philosophy 
following the seminal anthropological and sociological accounts of ‘play’ identified 
by Huizinga and Caillois will be reviewed.  Second, a critical analysis of the varying 
definitions of what constitutes ‘play’ in sport put forth by relevant sport 
philosophers will be examined.  Last, an examination of the consequences arising 
from our current understanding of these definitions, relative to the contemporary 
sporting context involving the sport industrial complex, will be presented.  This 
lusory introspection uses the framework of accepted definitional concepts of ‘play’ 
in order to decipher and understand meaning and significance of how we achieve 
self-actualization through sport.  My quest will use philosophy of sport to explore 
the existential meaning and significance of what it means to sincerely ‘play’ sport 
                                                        
22  Angela Schneider, “For the Love of the Game: A Philosophical Defense of 
Amateurism,” Quest, No. 45, (4), (1993): p. 462   
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while simultaneously navigating the obstacles of one’s own embodiment, the world, 
and the human condition. 
 In order to produce a well-organized account of a subject so broad I intend to 
separate the literature into three distinct areas.  I will begin with the origin of play 
characteristics proposed by Huizinga and Caillois through their respective 
anthropological and sociological accounts of the concept.  Here, play will be reduced 
to the essential characteristics that define its application in the modern sporting 
context.  From this perspective we can begin to explore the element of absurdity 
that is seemingly inherent ‘to play’ when contrasted with concepts of means-ended 
work.  This contrast will allow us to identify the meaning of play and its impact on 
our views of sport and game.  I will then turn my attention to the research literature 
that attempts to distinguish and define the essence of games and sports, alongside 
their relationship with play.  The works of Bernard Suits and Ludwig Wittgenstein 
will be utilized in attempt to focus on the conceptual analysis of the true structural 
framework of games.  From this framework we can try to decide on the structural 
identity of games and sport, which seem at least initially, virtually identical in 
makeup.  This provides the framework to determine how the nature of sport as 
concept shape normative values of the practice, while demonstrating the added 
contribution of ‘play’ to the inherent meaning of the activity.   Last, the works of 
Klaus Meier and Bernard Suits along with other notable sport philosophers engaged 
in a protracted debate over the precise nature of the tricky triad will be reviewed.  
What counts as sport, games, and play might seem to be a simple debate of opinion 
for the outsider, but it is of principal importance to the philosopher seeking an 
18 
 
introspective understanding of the true player’s lusory nature.  Without attempting 
to delimit a general concept to a more specific definition, it is impossible to 
prescribe what could be good, and proscribe what is bad.  On one level, the moral 
dimension of sports and games exist because of how we define these practices, 
which in turn, influences the decorum and conduct one must demonstrate to be 
engaged in them.  It becomes impossible to attempt moral evaluation without a 
more precise definition of the essence of them.  Therefore, with more definitional 
clarity we can better understand the existential meaning experienced by pure 
players, and further explore the incongruence of the modern sporting environment 
that often abandons the cherished meaning of the ‘play’ concept.  
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Chapter 2: Historical and Sociological Genealogies of Play 
2.1 Huizinga 
Johan Huizinga is among the several esteemed scholars who have published 
research examining play theory.  Although Huizinga was not the first to recognize 
the value of play in explaining human behavior, he is the first scholar in the Western 
world, to attempt an exact definition of play and of the various ways it manifests 
itself in all spheres of culture, the arts, philosophy, politics, and even legal 
institutions and warfare.23  As a cultural historian, Huizinga was primarily 
concerned with answering the theoretical question of what constitutes culture, how 
and why specific cultures come into being and pass away, how and why they sustain 
or fail to sustain themselves, and whether a historian is able to grasp their 
configurations.24  Upon considering his cultural research from a macro perspective, 
Huizinga arrived at the conclusion of viewing “man” and culture as sub specie ludi.25  
Homo Ludens is not the study of play as one of several human processes, but 
demonstrates the morphology of play as a phenomenon that precedes and drives 
cultural progress.  Huizinga’s historical research becomes valuable due the precise 
definition he constructs about play through its cultural manifestations.       
 Huizinga’s initial chapter on the nature and significance of play achieves the 
first workable definition of the play phenomenon.  It must be pointed out that 
Huizinga refers to the generic concept of play in an attempt to refine his definition.  
                                                        
23 Robert Anchor, “History and Play: Johan Huizinga and his Critics,” History and 
Theory. Vol. 17, No. 1 (1978): p. 63. 
24Anchor, p. 64. 
25From Latin translation: under the aspect of play. 
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Fittingly, he identifies play as not being restricted to human beings, after 
demonstrating that playful behavior can be observed in animals as well.  This 
observation led him to determine that play is more than a mere physiological 
phenomenon or psychological reflex.26  Play surpasses the boundary of purely 
biological activity and should be understood as a significant function, which takes on 
greater meaning for humans as it grows in sophistication.27  Huizinga determined 
that the significance of play revolves around its status as a phenomenon, and this 
new explanation for play weakened the logic upholding previous biological accounts 
rendering them untenable.28  Prior to the current philosophical study of play, it was 
assessed from the perspective of psychology and physiology.  According to Huizinga, 
these disciplines are steeped in the scientific method of observation and variable 
manipulation in order to isolate the cause that can serve as the basis for logical 
explanation of the science.29  The scientific notion of play is profoundly flawed 
because the scientific outlook presupposes a general biological function, which is 
not the case with play.  Huizinga recounts the multitude of biological suppositions 
used to rationalize play such as the discharge of superabundant energy, imitative 
instinct, preparatory simulation for maturity, and the need for relaxation or 
distraction.30  These beliefs don’t support the idea of play as a self-serving concept 
distinct from regular means-end activity.  The accounts of play justifying a biological 
purpose ultimately lead to conceptual problems since this rationale doesn’t 
                                                        
26 Huizinga, p. 1. 
27Ibid p. 2 
28Ibid p. 2 
29Ibid p. 2 
30Ibid p. 2 
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determine the true essence of play according to Huizinga, but at best might describe 
its possible benefits.  According to Huizinga, early scientific accounts of play were 
doomed to fail at the outset because they assume a logical connection between play 
activity and biological purpose that is not necessarily the case.31     
Huizinga charts a new course and directs his attention to the aesthetic 
phenomenon of play.  Play captivates a certain level of attention both from the 
player and potential spectators surrounding the activity.  Normally the activity 
carries a certain noticeable pleasure, possibly even electricity that is palpable for 
those involved allowing them to become lost in the moment.  The phenomenal 
property of play is the backbone supporting Huizinga’s definition.  Previous 
researchers on the subject steeped in scientific methodology couldn’t acknowledge 
this aspect because it transcends scientific analysis.  Huizinga defends the 
phenomenal account of play by stating, “Yet in this intensity, this absorption, this 
power of maddening, lies the very essence, the primordial quality of play.”32  
Huizinga’s phenomenal account of play can’t be subject to scientific scrutiny, and 
can’t be reduced to fit another category of human process, because it is its own end 
according to Huizinga.  Huizinga certifies his point about play’s phenomenal nature 
by again invoking the example of animals at play suggesting, “The reality of play 
extends beyond the sphere of human life and it cannot have its foundations in any 
rational nexus, because this would limit it to mankind.”33  With the departure from 
rational sensibilities, play contains a decided illogicality, especially for human kind.  
                                                        
31Huizinga, p .2. 
32Ibid p. 3  
33Ibid p. 3 
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I agree with Huizinga regarding the misapplication of scientific analysis when 
studying play for all reasons stated above.  Play is very much a phenomenon better 
studied through the refinement of a theoretical definition.  A definition can always 
be used to delimit a particular phenomenon, however science cannot accurately 
grasp the nonsensical nature of the activity.  External standards cannot make sense 
of the conduct, and this is precisely the reason that play is a self-predicable concept 
for Huizinga.  Therefore biological accounts of play can’t suffice as a definition 
because science can’t conceive of this elusive self-serving nature inherent within 
play, especially since it doesn’t contribute to any psychological or biological end.34  
Upon understanding play as a distinct, fundamental, supra-logical concept, Huizinga 
begins constructing a definition determined by five characteristics. 
 For play to occur it must be non-serious in order to escape the determinism 
of the universal order. By suggesting this non-serious nature for the activity 
Huizinga is not requiring an attitude of complete levity.  However, the agent can’t 
approach play with the sense of seriousness one would normally exhibit otherwise 
in the means-ended activity found in ordinary life.  This is quite different than the 
greater standard of “not serious” because anyone can attest that play can be taken 
very seriously upon witnessing the run-of-the-mill schoolyard populated with 
children playing earnestly in order to complete the game within the window of a 
brief recess.  Therefore, the qualification of “non”(serious) eliminates the conceptual 
difficulties involved with a completely frivolous outlook, while not progressing to 
                                                        
34Huizinga, p. 3. 
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the complete opposite end of the spectrum of complete and utter seriousness.35  
There is a balance point that, it could be suggested, is analogous to the theory of the 
golden mean posited by Aristotle which states, a virtue is the balance point between 
deficiency and excess.36  Upon establishing a foundation of play grounded in non-
seriousness Huizinga provides the characteristics that define play.  Prior to 
proposing his definition, he forwards an important caveat in order to limit the broad 
scope of the play concept.  Huizinga seeks to examine play in relation to culture; 
therefore he need not scrutinize all the forms of play, as he is only concerned with 
its sociocultural manifestations.  Herein, Huizinga makes an important distinction by 
identifying that play exists in sophisticated and primitive forms.  Sophisticated 
forms of play that manifest in our social environment are at Huizinga’s delimitations 
of play.  Primitive forms of play exist outside the realm of cultural history; therefore 
Huizinga is justified in excluding it from his analysis.  Nevertheless, he 
acknowledges primitive play exists, providing greater credence to his 
comprehensive navigation of this previously uncharted element of the human 
experience.           
The first principal aspect of play is the voluntary nature of it.37  Play cannot 
continue to be defined as so, if the agent is participating involuntarily or is subject to 
direction.  Play should be considered nonessential, and its meaning derives from the 
potential enjoyment of voluntarily choosing it.  Thus, play cannot be mandated 
outside of the solemn cultural functions Huizinga identifies, and can be stopped by 
                                                        
35 Huizinga p. 5 
36 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. William David Ross  (Oxford: University 
Press, 2009) p. 34.  
37Ibid p. 7 
24 
 
the agent at any point because one chooses to be involved.  Ultimately, for Huizinga, 
play can be considered akin to the overall idea of freedom, because it represents the 
acme of liberal activity.  With respect to this characteristic I wholeheartedly agree 
with Huizinga and would like to emphasize its importance for the purposes of my 
argument.  The voluntary nature of play relates back to absurdum in existential 
philosophy that suggests our lives have no inherent meaning.  Therefore, any 
possible meaning in our lives must be chosen voluntarily otherwise it isn’t a 
demonstration of our free will.  I’m unwilling to accept that extraneous inducements 
beyond the realm of play are acceptable to the amateur38 player.  They don’t 
represent a coercive force requiring the player to take action, but they do impede 
making a choice for something, in and of its own good, independent of another.  For 
the pursuit to bear the fruit of deep personal meaning it can’t be chosen for any 
reason beyond that of intrinsic fulfillment.  The ability to exercise free will because 
of our special cognitive gifts doesn’t necessitate that work be our central purpose.  
Finding meaning from self-actualization in a pursuit significant to the individual is 
central to those who are truly free.  Work for its own sake is bondage, but play exists 
throughout all facets of our civilization for people to exercise complete freedom.  
Huizinga discovered play under nearly every rock in the social landscape.39  It’s 
simply ironic that something so ordinarily insignificant as sport can unshackle a 
person and give them ultimate freedom if it is chosen for the right reasons.   
                                                        
 
39 Bernard Suits, “Words on Play,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport. IV (1977): p. 
117. 
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Huizinga’s second characteristic describes the concept of the magic circle, 
quite possibly the most famous and distinguishing feature of play.  Play is distinct 
and separate from ordinary life, existing in a temporary sphere of activity with a 
disposition all its own according to Huizinga.  This distinct sphere where play occurs 
is fundamentally dependent upon the non-serious requirement integral to play.  
Play and seriousness exist as polar opposites in Huizinga’s understanding of play.  In 
order to enter the play sphere the agent must suspend ordinary seriousness, only to 
the reawaken the traditional means-ended outlook upon play’s termination.  Play 
exists within everyday life; however it is distinct from ordinary life, since it occurs in 
its own time place.  This characteristic is best understood by the pretend nature of 
the play activity, for example consider the childhood game ‘Cops and Robbers.’  It is 
obvious to anyone witnessing such childish tomfoolery that the participants are only 
pretending, but internally they consider themselves to be as cunning as John 
Dillinger while matched with the resolve of a Melvin Purvis.  The pretend quality of 
play doesn’t preclude them from possible serious involvement within play, but 
pretending betrays a consciousness of the inferiority of play compared with 
ordinary seriousness, a feeling that seems to be something as primary as play 
itself.40     
Play is not subjected to the confines of ordinary life, it exists beyond the 
immediate satisfaction of natural wants and appetites.  It interrupts the normal 
human appetitive process of means-ended behavior.  Play becomes the interlude 
                                                        
40 Huizinga, p. 8 
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within quotidian life.41  Play is incorporated within our lives; however it serves no 
purpose beyond itself. The beauty of it, as alluded to earlier in the introduction, is 
that it begins as an amusement or distraction; however, it becomes the 
accompaniment, the complement, in fact an integral part of life in general.42  
Without play we cease to possess the glimmer that enrich our very souls. 
   Huizinga’s third point completes the distinct magic circle concept, by 
asserting that play not only exists in a separate region from ordinary life but also 
temporal period.  The magic circle concept has play occurring in a distinct time and 
place, withdrawn from the ordinary possessing its own progression and meaning.  
The magic circle is a name for this abstract consecrated setting where play occurs 
separate from the ordinary.  An apt example of this is Sanford stadium on the 
campus of the University of Georgia, where supporters unintentionally illustrate the 
separation of the magic circle by using a particularly apropos expression.  In 
reference to the ornamental privet hedge bordering the stadium playing field, the 
Georgia football team play’s its home games “Between the Hedges.”43  Within the 
stadium, a perimeter of privet hedges surrounds the field demarcating the 
consecrated football field from the other.  The passion of play unfolds within the 
enclosure of the hedges spawning a temporary world encapsulated by the looming 
presence of the ordinary world of the university’s campus.  Georgia football zealots 
constantly refer to the metonym as opposed to the stadium’s proper name, 
                                                        
41 Huizinga, p. 8 
42 Ibid p. 9 
43 Bill King, “What Could Make a Day Between the Hedges Even Better for UGA Fans,” 
Atlanta Journal of Constitution. (June 15th, 2013) Retrieved from 
http://blogs.ajc.com/junkyard-blawg/2013/06/15/what-could-make-a-day-
between-the-hedges-even-better-for-uga-fans/ 
27 
 
implicitly acknowledging and celebrating the preeminence of the “magic circle 
dedicated to the performance of an act apart.”44  Within the confines of the magic 
circle new meaning is infused within those playing because the world they inhabit is 
completely detached from the nonplaying world, yet enveloped by it.  This is largely 
attributed to Huizinga’s fourth point of play’s absolute and peculiar order.45  For 
play to occur in the sophisticated cultural spheres Huizinga identifies that play 
demands absolute order.  Ordinary life is full of confusion and uncertainty, while 
play institutes a temporary limited type of perfection brought about by the harmony 
of adhering to an overarching rule structure.  The rules that sanction play are 
sacrosanct, allowing for the maintenance of the play sphere operating from a new 
point of consciousness.  This new cosmos enchants the player because the 
institution of rules places the ultimate goal achievement at risk, providing tension 
that the player must overcome by achieving an objective.  Although play transcends 
the evaluative moral critiques of “good or bad,” “right or wrong,” an ethical aspect 
emerges from the player’s motivation to relieve the tension within the contest by 
achieving the objective while complying with the rules.  The rules are essential to 
the continued maintenance of the play-concept’s order.  Without rules, play is 
robbed of its harmonious perfectibility, and ceases to exist.  The play world is fragile 
and the play community can be robbed of the play illusion by a simple transgression 
of the tenets upholding its constitution.  Therefore, the ideal player acknowledges 
the order of the play world by way of the rules, but doesn’t view them as hindrance 
but something to be embraced because it is the essence of the endeavor.   
                                                        
44 Huizinga, p. 10 
45Ibid p. 10 
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Finally, Huizinga’s last characteristic of play derives from the idea that play is 
completely self-serving.46  With the initiation and existence of the play world, 
completely divorced from the ordinary pleasures serving our normal appetitive 
process become suspended, and are inconsequential within the play world.  Play 
begins and ends with itself, producing nothing beyond itself. Upon the termination 
of the play sphere, one can seek to satisfy these natural processes, but the play 
world can’t contribute to external material gain from the ordinary world. 
By combining the essential characteristics of play outlined, Huizinga provides 
the first scholarly definition of the play concept,  
Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free 
activity standing quite consciously outside “ordinary” life as being 
“not serious,” but at the same time absorbing the player intensely 
and utterly.  It is an activity connected with no material interest, and 
no profit can be gained by it.  It proceeds within its own proper 
boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an 
orderly manner.47 
 
Upon equipping us with the general definition of play, Huizinga sets out to 
demonstrate how play manifests itself within specific segments of our culture in the 
form of competition or agonistic struggle.  Among Huizinga’s best examples is the 
play form in philosophy itself.  He recounts back to the days of antiquity and the 
reverence paid to the sophist of the period, specifically citing the famed 
Protagoras.48  The sophist’s principal goal was to demonstrate exceptional 
knowledge, while overcoming the objections of their interlocutor in the dialectic.  
The truth need not be central to the sophist’s purpose unlike the genuine 
                                                        
46 Huizinga, p. 21 
47 Ibid p. 13 
48 Ibid p. 147 
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philosopher.  Plato condemned sophists for using deceitful and misleading 
rhetorical tricks to manipulate others into accepting fallacious arguments.49  The 
rejection of sophistry did not bring about the end of play within philosophy.  
Philosophy maintains playful features due to its nature as a contest, despite 
pursuing gravely serious questions concerning things like the essence of truth, 
epistemology, and morality. The Socratic method, a staple in the corpus of Platonic 
dialogues perfectly encapsulates what Huizinga describes as, “ancient philosophy’s 
close association with play in the form of contest.”50  Philosophical thought arises in 
a competitive process of the dialectal method governed by the rule and order of 
factual truths derived from the refinement of logical truth between the 
interlocutors.  The play element is relevant in ancient philosophy because in the 
case of Protagoras, he operates outside of the supreme order of truth seeking; 
therefore, he doesn’t practice philosophy.51  In order for the play element to exist, 
the sophist must disregard his roundabout rhetoric used to win the argument 
because the magic circle that fosters play in the form of philosophy occurs as a 
contest and can’t proceed without the interlocutors advancing what they 
understand to be a factual truth.52  While philosophy is not mere ‘play,’ it has 
nonetheless preserved playful characteristics.                                      
Homo Ludens concludes with a chapter that specifically evaluates the 
sporting aspect of play.  Huizinga expresses a dreary outlook on the modern 
sporting conception of the play element, possibly coming to the conclusion that our 
                                                        
49 Huizinga, p. 148 
50 Ibid p. 152 
51 Ibid p. 147 
52 Ibid p. 148 
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contemporary culture marks the death of play as a phenomenon that breeds and 
evolves culture.53  According to Huizinga, the 19th Century marks the period where 
sport transitions from occasional amusement to the system of organized clubs and 
matches. During this period, England became the cradle of modern sporting life with 
increased systemization and regimentation for physical activity, robbing sport of its 
pure play-quality.54  Huizinga perceives that the disparate terms, ‘professional’ and 
‘amateur,’ originating from this period, perfectly capture the idea of play’s 
termination, because it no longer possesses elements of non-seriousness and 
freedom.  This sort of classification system of ranking participants suggests a 
hierarchy that considers sport means-ended.  Distinguishing between the two 
approaches marks out those for whom playing is no longer play, ranking them 
inferior to the true players in standing, but superior in performance of task.55  Sport 
ceases to be play if approached from a serious manner, as Huizinga has noted, play 
is essentially non-serious.  This is the primary difficulty with the modern sports 
occurring during the inter war years when Homo Ludens was written, which pales 
in comparison to the contemporary standards that treat sport as being about life or 
death.  Ultimately, the play concept is at deep conflict within the modern sporting 
culture that confuses the nature of seriousness.  Within sport we have an activity 
nominally known as play, but raised to such a pitch of technical organization and 
scientific thoroughness that the real play spirit is threatened with extinction.56  
Professional sports often retain elements such as spirited competition, commitment 
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54 Ibid p. 197 
55 Ibid p. 196 
56 Ibid p. 199 
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to excellence, and teamwork.  However this all occurs within the structure of a 
performance with some spontaneous elements.              
Huizinga depicts contemporary civilization as one in which material 
interests, cynicism, and the negation of every norm not only exists (as they always 
have), but are elevated into absolutes in place of the rules that underlie all play, all 
noble activity, and all honorable competition. The decadence of play is evident in the 
breakdown of the distinction between play and seriousness, whereby the serious 
business of life politics, war, economics, and morality degenerate into pseudo-play, 
and play loses its indispensable qualities of spontaneity, detachment, joy, and thus, 
its power to act as a culture-creating activity. The decadence of play is evident also 
in the commercialization, professionalization, and politicization of sport, which 
perverts recreation and reduces it to crude sensationalism.  Today we celebrate the 
dramatic and extraordinary elements of sport.  The technical nuance and 
appreciation for minute skill has vanished, only to be replaced by an insatiable 
appetite for spectacular performance.  It is evident in the perversion of culture by 
puerilism, which, for Huizinga, instead of making boys into men, adapts the conduct 
of the community to that of the adolescent age.57 All of this, Huizinga concludes, 
clearly shows that there can be no civilization without play and rules of fair play, 
without conventions consciously established and voluntarily adhered to, and 
without knowledge of how to win and lose graciously. The supreme importance to 
civilization of the play factor is precisely that, "Civilization presupposes limitation 
and mastery of the self, the ability not to confuse its own tendencies with the 
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ultimate and highest goal, but to understand that it is enclosed within certain 
bounds freely accepted."58  
Huizinga’s purpose is not sport-centered, in fact he seems rather 
unconcerned with sport or its close relative, ‘game.’  Huizinga uses the occasional 
sport example up until his last chapter to elucidate his definition of play, but he 
doesn’t pursue identifying the interrelationship of what became labeled play, game, 
and sport because it is beyond the scope of his purpose. The significance of 
Huizinga’s Homo Ludens is his definition of play.  Nonetheless, he seems to stumble 
into the space where play and games intersect, but they are proven to be distinct as 
pointed out by Carlson later in this section.  
 
2.2 Caillois  
Roger Caillois’ account of play in his book Man, Play and Games is a direct response 
to what he considers the definitional shortcomings of Huizinga’s Homo Ludens, 
while examining play through a sociological lens.  Caillois draws conclusions that 
are quite similar to Huizinga, in regard to the definition of play and the 
characteristics that support it.  While Caillois acknowledges the importance of his 
predecessor’s thesis linking cultural development to exploration of the play 
element, he correctly reasons that Huizinga left much of the play concept 
unexplored.59  Caillois charts a different path, seeking a comprehensive definition of 
the play concept in consideration of all its variations and applications for humanity.  
                                                        
58 Huizinga, p. 211 
59 Roger Caillois, Man, Play, and Games, trans. Meyer Barash. (The Free Press of 
Glencoe Inc. Great Britain, 1961), p. 4 
33 
 
Huizinga discovers play in non-traditional areas we wouldn’t normally consider 
throughout Home Ludens, but his general view on play seems to be influenced most 
by the competitive contest.  He further refines Huizinga’s original definition, while 
further expanding the sphere of play by introducing his typology of games and 
cementing their relationship to play.60  Caillois immediately begins to address the 
inadequacies of Homo Ludens, most principally Huizinga’s omission of games in 
relation to his understanding of the play element.  However, he recognizes the scope 
of Huizinga’s research precluded him from exploring this aspect of play similarly 
present in games, because his focus rested on the generation and spawning of 
cultural practices through play.  The first section of Man, Play, and Games is 
dedicated to refining Huizinga’s original definition and classifying the different 
types of play occurring.  This section of his book on the definition of play is the 
primary focus of this paper; however, it is not concerned with sociological theory 
that Caillois delves into towards the second half of the book.  As a sport philosopher, 
the brunt of my focus will be on the clarity of Caillois progression in formulating a 
correct definition, and its possible utility for achieving my research goal.            
   Caillois begins by unveiling reworked definitional characteristics similar to 
Huizinga’s original definition of play.  He, too, agrees that play is first and foremost a 
free and voluntary activity considered as a source of joy and amusement.61  
According to Caillois who followed in the wake of Huizinga, the player must be able 
to choose participation freely and terminate play at any point he desires, because it 
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only serves as a diversion to escape quotidian life.62  The free activity described 
occurs within Huizinga’s protected space described as the magic circle.  The game’s 
domain is therefore a restricted, closed, protected universe: a pure space.63  In 
addition, the rules provide play with intrinsic value because they are unique to the 
magic circle.  Caillois adds to this idea by suggesting that ordinary laws become 
suspended in favor of new laws unique to the magic circle that are singularly 
enforced   These elements of the definition of play are holdovers from Huizinga, but 
Caillois institutes three changes to the characteristics in order to give his account of 
play. 
 First, Caillois points out Huizinga incorrectly asserts that play is uninvolved 
with material profit or gain.64  Huizinga doesn’t subscribe to the idea of betting 
games, and those of chance, belonging to the realm of play, as he suggests play 
involves no material interest.65  Caillois reasons that the casino dealer doesn’t play 
in games of chance; however the tension felt by the casino players as they passively 
await the resolution of an uncertain situation represents the capriciousness of 
chance that constitutes just another type of game.66  According to Caillois, property 
can be exchanged among the players in a zero sum game, but his view of games 
seems heavily influenced by the perspective of ordinary work aiming for 
production.67  Caillois suggests no external goods are generated as result of 
participation, which demonstrates his inclination towards comparing the play world 
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with the ordinary means-ended world.   Therefore, this example leads Caillois to 
characterize play as an occasion of pure waste, in the sense that it represents the 
passing of productive time that doesn’t yield fruit.68  Since Huizinga regards play as 
incompatible with profit or the gaining of material interests, there is no room for 
games of chance in his definition of play.  Caillois seeks to remedy the problem of 
material inducements by arguing that while play has to be unproductive, it need not 
preclude the players from exchanging property or wealth with one another.69 The 
goal of play cannot be to produce anything external to the play sphere such as 
money, but they still may fully experience the characteristics that circumscribe play 
if limited transfer while forbidding production of entirely new external benefits.  
The players’ attitudes, if they are indeed playing must reflect this attitude, otherwise 
they are involved in something else that is not play.  Caillois’ tenet mandating the 
absence of external goods serves to exclude professional players from playing.  
Caillois’ definition creates a dichotomous relationship between play and extrinsic 
reward that is irreconcilable.  Caillois considers play as sort of zero-sum game.  
There is no productive value at all when playing, hence the idea of pure waste, or an 
unproductive nature, relative to the ordinary means-ended approach.  Play is 
something that is a good in itself.  It has internal goods that are the primary reason 
for participating and engaging in the play. But this does not exclude the possibility of 
external factors playing a part in conjunction with the intrinsic nature of the activity. 
Many things can both be goods-in-themselves while at the same time still being 
constitutive of other goods.  Huizinga’s requirement of play’s intrinsic exclusivity, or 
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the complete corruptive nature external goods have on the intrinsic seems 
erroneous and unwarranted.  External elements can exist within play as Caillois 
rightly posits; however, his error rests in the play world’s relative comparison to 
means-ended work production.    
 Second, Caillois proposes that play possesses a fictive component that can 
stand in place of the traditional rule order previously mentioned by Huizinga that 
protects and maintains the magic circle.  Where Huizinga only gives primitive play a 
cursory overview, Caillois focuses on this type of play, further expanding the range 
of the play concept.  Primitive play doesn’t necessarily subscribe to rules; therefore 
it is the freest form of spontaneous play usually in the form of improvisation.70   The 
absence of binding rules in games like ‘cops and robbers’ requires affirmation of a 
fictive play element in order to maintain the play sphere.  For Caillois the fictive 
element in primitive play serves the same purpose of rule order.  This awareness of 
basic the unreality of the assumed behavior is separate from real life and from the 
arbitrary legislation that defines other games.71  Failing to acknowledge this 
awareness quashes the play illusion, returning the player back to the ordinary. 72  
Caillois effectively points out play isn’t subject to rule order and fiction to maintain 
the magic circle, it is either ruled ordered or fictitious.  
 Last, there is a source of uncertainty inherent to play.  This is similar to 
Huizinga’s concept of tension but more accurately defined.  Consider for example 
the difference between the home team trailing by one run, and conversely holding a 
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five-run lead during the 9th inning while down to its last out of a baseball game.  In 
the former circumstance the crowd would be waving towels and cheering knowing 
one swing of the bat can tie the game.  That tension and electricity described by 
Huizinga sweeps through those involved because the action is still unfolding and is 
far from resolved.  In the latter case, the play sphere dissolves because the 
circumstances have eliminated the element of uncertainty upon the resolution of 
play.  Hence why in the latter situation, the visitor’s 27th out signals the point when 
teams will promptly retire to the showers, thereby ignoring the legislated rules 
maintaining the play order by foregoing their ‘at bat’ because nothing more can be 
decided in game because it is won, decisively.  The same is true for other sports 
where a team firmly secures facile victory.  Nothing is more anticlimactic than a 
contest decided by half time because one team is significantly overmatched.  
Certainty is the antithesis of play, since it removes the latitude of a player’s control 
over his or her own circumstance when the game as been essentially determined.  
Well-executed play, at least in sport, flows from beautifully-improvised reaction in 
response to one’s opponent working in harmonious concert.  The obligation to 
operate within the framework of the rules brings rise to the moral component of the 
activity in structured play, as previously introduced.  For Caillois and myself, the just 
result is one that is uncertain, and by continuing the uncertainty within the play 
sphere, one can remain at play in this dynamic with an opponent.  
 In summation Caillois describes the characteristics comprising play as: (1) 
free activity/choice: (2) a play sphere separated by space and time: (3) uncertain 
course of action: (4) unproductive state of affairs: (5) governed by rules: and (6) 
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operating within a fictitious reality (Caillois, p. 9).73  This definition doesn’t diverge 
much from Huizinga’s which states: (1) play is voluntary: (2) it is different from 
ordinary affairs especially those of material interest: (3) it is secluded or limited by 
special times, places, and cultural configurations: (4) explores tension and balance 
within the framework of the rules: and (5) characterized by secrecy and disguise.74    
Thomas Henricks, a contemporary play theorist, recognizes Caillois’ work as 
a response to Homo Ludens that fortifies the play concept in a subtle way.75  Upon 
analysis of the two definitions, both Huizinga and Caillois seem to generally agree on 
play’s basic structure, as Caillois makes only the slightest revisions to Huizinga’s 
original definition.76  Henrick asserts about Huizinga,  
Against the long-standing philosophical tradition of homo sapiens-
humans as thinkers-and the materialist thesis of homo faber-humans as 
makers-Huizinga advances his claim for homo ludens-humans as players-
a vision of people as active explorers and negotiators of societal 
possibility.  In Huizinga’s view, people have an impulse to play that 
cannot be explained by other factors or elements of human society or 
nature.  This creative impulse has been critical to processes of societal 
self-consciousness and renewal throughout history.  Because of this, 
contemporary societies should be careful not to restrict or corrupt the 
very activity that forms one basis of their existence.77           
 
Henrick’s believes Caillois’ sociological arguments of ritualized behavior 
guaranteeing the purity of sacred spaces like play suggests he shares a similar anti-
utilitarian spirit with Huizinga.78  However, I would like to point out that Caillois 
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makes a radical departure from the extensive umbrella of Huizinga’s definition of 
play only to once again qualify the player according to the purpose of production, 
the ultimate goal of homo faber.  Huizinga simply precludes play from being useful 
for external goods in his definition, while Caillois considers play relative to function 
in determining that it is unproductive.  Such language implies play is being 
measured against conduct that is means-ended, which I see as a key misstep by 
Caillois.  
 
2.3 Caillois’ Play Continuum and Typology of Games 
Despite this misstep during the assembly of a definition, Caillois’ addition to the 
literature is significant because he evolves his theory from Huizinga’s broad account 
of play to include the close relation of the concept of game. Caillois specifically 
defines the multiple forms of ‘game’ that contribute to his refined definition of play.  
Caillois distinguishes between play and games, representing the first logical 
progression assisting sport philosophers with determining the relationship between 
the more recent concept of the ‘tricky triad.’  By expanding his definition of ‘play’ to 
utilize a typology of ‘game’ Caillois should be credited with improving the 
definitional concept.  He highlights the different experiences sensed by the player 
throughout a wide range of games.  However, he is unable to precisely outline the 
essence of the specie ‘game’ independent of the play concept.  Caillois simply 
subsumes it under the genus play.  Caillois’ definitional structure seems to fall into 
the trap of conflating the concepts of ‘game’ and ‘play’, posited by Carlson in the next 
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section.  Caillois views games on a wide spectrum differentiating games by elements 
of competition, chance, simulation, and vertigo.79  
 Caillois’ typology of games is a fundamental aspect to his text, primarily 
because it structures the range of experience from primitive play all the way to 
highly structured play.80  The typology of games forwarded by Caillois doesn’t 
differentiate between types of game using mental or physical skills, but solely on the 
basis of how each game’s framework draws distinctive play characteristics.  This 
leads to the identification of four types of game forms: Agon, Alea, Mimicry, and Ilinx.  
Each of the four forms represent a similar general nature of game, but the division 
between each form rests on Caillois’ innovative concept of a ‘play’ continuum that 
seems to begin identifying games and the serious activity of sports as being 
determined by the structure of the activity.  He designates one end of the continuum 
to represent paidia.81  Paidia is viewed as completely unstructured, frolicsome, and 
frivolous.  The polar opposite end of the play continuum is designated as ludus.  
Ludus signifies activity that is purposeful, contains artificial restrictions, and 
requires tremendous skill and effort to overcome these impediments.  The range of 
play on Caillois’ continuum is linked with the range of experience a player 
undergoes when moving along from primitive play to high performance activity.  
Caillois suitably identifies the structural mechanisms that dictate the range of 
experience within the play sphere that are a central element of games within the 
following classification table.    
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Figure 1: Classification of Games82 
 
 AGÔN 
(Competition) 
ALEA 
(Chance) 
MIMICRY 
(Simulation) 
ILINX 
(Vertigo) 
 
PAIDIA 
 
  Tumult 
  Agitation 
  Immoderate laughter 
 
 
   
  Kite-flying 
  Solitaire 
  Patience 
  Crossword puzzles 
 
 
LUDUS 
 
Racing               not       
Wrestling   regulated   
Etc. 
Athletics    
 
 
 
Boxing, Billiards 
Fencing, Checkers 
Football, Chess 
 
Contests, Sports in general 
 
Counting-out     
rhymes 
Heads or tails 
 
 
 
 
Betting 
Roulette 
 
 
Simple, 
complex, and 
continuing 
lotteries 
 
Children’s 
initiations 
Games of illusion 
Tag, Arms 
Masks, Disguises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theater 
Spectacles in 
general 
 
Children “whirling” 
Horseback riding 
Swinging 
Waltzing 
 
 
 
Volador 
Traveling carnivals 
Skiing 
Mountain Climbing 
Tightrope walking 
 
 
* In each vertical column games are classified in such an order that the paidia element is constantly decreasing 
while the ludus element is ever increasing. 
 
Caillois’ four ‘game’ types expand immensely upon Huizinga’s early account 
of ‘play’, which assimilates all cultural play activities occurring into the form of a 
contest.83  Caillois uses the play continuum to sort between different activities 
belonging to his four games categories.  The combination of the concepts play and 
game represents the confusion alluded to earlier, and will be addressed further in 
the next section on Carlson’s idea of the conflation of play and game.  The table 
above provides a clear illustration of how Caillois orders and defines activity 
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according to the play continuum with the sub-set of each type of game.  Like his 
predecessor, Caillois begins with the most recognizable game form to humanity, that 
he terms Agon.  These ‘games’ reflect the ludus pole of the play spectrum taking the 
forms of game and sport within the framework of a ‘contest.’  Typically these 
contests begin from a point of equality, attempting to balance the chances of 
winning for either side.84  The play form presupposes sustained attention and skill 
development on the player’s part according to the structured ludus pole of the 
spectrum that restricts the player to operate within the framework of the rules.85  
The game type Alea poses a fundamental contrast with Agon.  Such play excludes the 
decision-making power of the player and the outcome is no longer subject to their 
control.  In this case, fortune is the sole determinant of success in this play form 
because they have relinquished all control to elements of chance.  However, both 
play forms can be combined into a hybridized style of play.  Caillois cites the 
example of card games where blind luck (Alea) and optimal strategy (Agon) combine 
to make the play world more thrilling than it otherwise would due to the 
uncertainty.86  Agon and Alea imply opposite and somewhat complementary 
attitudes, but they both obey the same law in creating the conditions of pure 
equality denied in real life.87  The perfected nature of the background conditions, in 
combination with the rule-bound structure is what makes the play world special in 
this instance.  Most importantly this development exposes the inadequacy of 
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Huizinga’s parochial account of play as only occurring in the form of a contest.88  The 
fact that a range of experiences can be faced possibly in conjunction with one 
another seems to progress the complexity of play’s multi-faceted nature especially 
when contrasted with Caillois’ two remaining categories.  Mimicry is the third play 
form identified by Caillois, which greatly expands the possibility of what activities 
can be considered play.  Caillois defines mimicry as follows; 
Presupposing the temporary and free acceptance, if not of an illusion 
(illusion is a word with loaded meaning deriving from the 
combination of the Latin preposition and stem, literally meaning in a 
state of play), then at least of closed, conventional, and, in certain 
respects, imaginary universe.89   
 
The player attempts to escape from him or herself through playful illusion in 
order to construct and truly be something or someone of make-believe.  Such 
behavior contains all the necessary characteristics to be classified as play since it 
occurs freely, within the magic circle, has a sense of order, and possesses an obvious 
fictitious element supporting the play sphere.90  Mimicry begins as we move further 
away from ludus end of the continuum, towards the paidia end. This type of playful 
behavior is witnessed in all sorts of activity. Caillois cites the common example of a 
child’s tendency to mimic adult behavior, such as the previous example used of ‘cops 
and robbers.’  However, Caillois provides a most surprising example of adult 
mimicry we ordinarily wouldn’t recognize as play, in the dramatic arts.91  It becomes 
reasonable to surmise this form of play is where theatre gets the colloquial 
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appellation “a play.”  The play element present is the transformation to something 
considered other, and distinct from self, while remaining consciously grounded in 
the fact of creating an illusion.  The actor does not try to make you truly believe that 
he is really the tragic hero Oedipus.  It’s only the real life spy who attempts to 
convince themself of their deception because they aren’t playing, their conduct is 
profoundly serious.92       
In examining the play element, the spectators or non-participants have been 
largely overlooked mainly by Huizinga.  Caillois brilliantly points out that mimicry 
isn’t reserved for the aforementioned situations, but occurs in conjunction with the 
contest as well.93  Due to the required nature of uncertainty as a fundamental 
characteristic of the contest, Caillois suggests the spectator demonstrates an 
inclination towards identifying with a champion.94  I submit that identifying with the 
champion player in itself constitutes mimicry, similar to the emotions that captivate 
the reader allowing them to visualize and live within the precarious and uncertain 
world of their protagonist.  Daniel Wann and Nyla Branscombe describe the sporting 
equivalent of this form of mimicry as basking in reflected glory (BIRGing).95  Wann & 
Branscombe theories derive from the field of psychology.  Their analysis of the 
concept of BIRGing is rooted social identity theory (Wann & Branscombe, p.107).96 
This explains how one’s self esteem can be influenced by another individual’s 
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success through identifying with them vicariously.97  Wann & Branscombe suggest a 
natural connection develops when a spectator becomes enamored with a person or 
group playing in a contest due to shared characteristics.  The cultural value of play 
in the form of contest is undeniable and is pointed in Huizinga’s first analysis of play 
in Homo Ludens.98  Sports easily rival works of great cultural significance like novels 
and movies from the standpoint of mimicry.  However, sports events are 
nevertheless special occasions for mimcry, since the simulation is transferred from 
the participants to the spectating audience.99  Identification with the champion in 
itself (BIRGing) constitutes mimicry related to that of the reader with the hero of a 
novel.  The captivity of sport on the spectator surpasses the playful mimicry of a 
reader because the potential hero playing in the contest struggles to attain a desired 
but unrealized end that is uncertain, unlike the classic book that invariable ends in 
the with the same resolution.  Despite the uncertainty in sport, the fanatical 
spectator has already envisioned or dreamt of the desired end through imitative 
play, explaining their euphoric craze once their hero has been crowned.    
The final play form proposed by Caillois is completely unstructured and 
nonsensical.  “Ilinx is the pursuit of vertigo and which consist of an attempt to 
momentarily destroy the stability of perception and inflict a kind of voluptuous 
panic upon an otherwise lucid mind.” 100   Ironically the very name ilinx derives from 
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the Greek word for vertigo Ilingos.101  This form of play achieves the temporary 
escape from normal sensory perception, opening up an entirely other world that is 
euphoric and exhilarating.  This type of experience is not achieved easily when 
limited to one’s own body, the body cannot generate the speed or flight required to 
sense vertigo.  However, with instruments and technology, spectacular exploits are 
now becoming more common, whether that be the circus acrobat, or the lunacy of 
base jumpers and wind-suit pilots.  Therefore, I’m of the belief that thrill seekers 
who push the limits of their bodies through untraditional and perilous means, 
experience play, in the form of Ilingos, just as a ball player would, but can also 
receive the added benefit of complete rapture.  Regardless of the nature of their 
chosen activity, being decidedly different from traditional games they are involved 
within a type of activity that provides them a similar play experience that contains 
all the six characteristics of play but from a different experience brought on by the 
pursuit of vertigo.        
2.4 The Conflation of Play                                                                                      
Chad Carlson is a contemporary sport philosopher who suggests that the question of 
the connection between play and games is an important question that is yet to be 
adequately answered.  Carlson finds faults within the analysis of Huizinga and 
Caillois’ definition of play, grouping other later play theorists with making the 
similar mistake of conflation.102  The aforementioned authors fit into a pattern of 
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depicting an ambiguous, or otherwise confusing, description of play and game.103  
This mistake has resulted in what Carlson describes as the conflation of play and 
game.  Conflation is the unwarranted combining of two things into one, especially 
concerning similar phenomena whose differences are often overlooked, ignored, or 
mistaken.104  Carlson specifically posits that Huizinga’ conditions, that lead to his 
definition, is the origin of the conflation.105  Huizinga fails to distinguish clearly 
between two aspects of lived experience.106  These ambiguities result in play being 
understood as a combination between an approach to doing something, and the 
particular thing that is being done.107  Huizinga’s initial characteristics such as being 
voluntary, free, and absorbing the player intensely and utterly, speak to a player’s 
attitude or stance towards the activity in question.108  Yet, some of the remaining 
characteristics are those of how activities are conducted such as fixed rules and 
order.  Huizinga establishes his definition of play using a hybrid account of an 
attitudinal approach and an activity based understanding of it.  Arising from this is 
the problem clarity between play and games.109  Chad Carlson’s highlights the 
problem regarding the conflation, while also providing the precise criteria for 
distinguishing between play and games.  Carlson goes on to explain the idea of 
conflation and how original definitions of play mislead previous sport 
philososphers.     
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Play exists while demonstrating an autotelic approach to the world, 
essentially participating because the pursuits chosen are ends in and of 
themselves. Play can also be described as the thing which one is engaged for 
example climbing trees, building sandcastles, or simply hitting the baseball 
without the presence of fielders.  Similarly games are also understood as 
things, activities, and conventions like chess, Sudoku, or football.  But we also 
refer to gaming as an attitude, perhaps an ironic or gratuitous attitude of 
looking for and taking on unnecessary problems.  Thus, it would be reasonable 
to distinguish playing from play activities and gaming from game activities.  
Playing and gaming, as stances or attitudes, are ways in which we do things.  
They are distinct intentionalities toward the projects we encounter.  For 
playing, the intentionality or act is autotelic, while for gaming it is lusory 
essentially aiming at a solution of an unnecessary problem.   Conflation 
problems stem from a failure to properly highlight these distinctions and 
accurately characterize them.  On the side of intentionality- that is the side of 
attitudes, stances, and approaches to the world it becomes apparent that the 
play stance and the gaming attitude are distinct and compatible.  That is, they 
have a life of their own, but they also overlap.  We see their overlap in the 
compound or nested intentionality of what Suits ambiguously calls game 
playing.  It is and intentionality that is both autotelic and lusory at the same 
time.  Game players, in the deepest sense of those terms, are looking for 
engaging artificial problems as an end in itself.110      
 
 Carlson’s argument certainly exposes the possibility that Huizinga seems to 
conflate play with the close relationship it has with games.  This produces the 
unintended result of defining play using the nearly identical structural criteria of a 
game.  Following Huizinga, philosophers of sport credit his work defining play as a 
critical milestone to work from, making possible the further distinctions between 
the nature of sports and games.  The agent participating in games and sports has a 
play like attitude that exemplifies these structured activities that are grounded 
within the domain of play.  Huizinga doesn’t attempt to chart the connections 
between games and sports, however, it is clear he views them as both possessing 
playful characteristics.  This is primarily due to the fact that Huizinga conceives of 
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play from the standpoint of competition or agonistic struggle.111  Such a narrow 
perspective on play’ is what constitutes the extent of play in his pioneering 
definition, according to Henricks.        
Caillois’ classification of games within play similarly contributes towards a 
logical confusion of the two concepts.112  This stems from the alternating use of the 
concept of ‘play ‘ and ‘game’ in the second chapter of Man, Play, Games.113  A major 
objection requiring serious consideration involves the distinguished factors 
between ‘play’ and ‘game’ that are no longer so clearly defined after Caillois’ theory 
on their relationship has been established.  Within the scope of Man, Play, and 
Games, game and sport remain impregnated within the motherly domain of play, 
not yet mature enough to be considered distinct entities.   
The amorphous relation Caillois draws between play and game doesn’t help 
in outlining what constitutes a game.   This is especially troubling in the initial two 
chapters: ‘The Definition of Play,’ and ‘The Classification of Games,’ that are 
predicated on definitional advancement of Huizinga’s original work.114  Caillois uses 
the terms ‘play’ and ‘game’ interchangeably, first reworking Huizinga’s definition of 
play, but upon transitioning to his typology of ‘play,’ he uses the term ‘games’ 
referring to the same concept.115  The shift in terminology occurs without any 
indication of a transition from one phenomenon to another.116  It could be suggested 
that Caillois seems to consider that play and games are linked and, hence, the 
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unselective appearance of each term throughout crucial parts of the text while 
establishing the critical defining points of the play concept.  The terminology used to 
enhance Huizinga’s definition in addition to Caillois’ expansion of the range of play, 
results in the conflation of play and games, as identified by Carlson and confirmed 
for myself.  As a consequence, I’m unclear if play and games are separate 
phenomena, or one in the same, for Caillois.  
 
2.5 Sub-Conclusion of the Analytical Definitions of Play        
Both Huizinga and Caillois provide a sturdy foundation to begin scrutiny of game 
and sport by underscoring their close relationship with play.  Despite the strength 
on their respective accounts of play, neither seeks to explicitly define the essence of 
game or its relation.  However I believe some characteristics of their definitions 
require retooling if we are to view play as a meaningful concept.  The definitions, as 
presented by both Huizinga and Caillois, fail to convey why play is a sacred space 
requiring a shielding force from what seems to be the inescapable encroachment of 
ordinary means-ended behavior.  Both dedicate significant attention to what seems 
like the inevitable; however, they fail to specifically explicate why or what meaning 
comes from playing, which in this specific instance applies to sport.  I will answer 
this important objection I have to the works of both of these early play theorists 
throughout the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: A New Perspective 
3.1 Going from the Analytical to the Existential 
The most salient characteristic put forth by both Huizinga and Caillois is the relative 
insignificance of play.  Huizinga claims play cannot produce external good, while 
Caillois considers it to be unproductive or pure waste.  Callois’ outlook requires 
immediate attention as it proves more troubling, since it maintains the position that 
play has no utility whatsoever and is pure waste.  By this statement one could 
determine, ipso facto, that play carries no meaning when regarded in that way.   
Such thinking completely trivializes one’s efforts during play activity, essentially 
reducing it to mean nothing subsequent to the disintegration of the magic circle.  My 
contention early on in the introduction, claims that this is simply not true, and for 
Caillois to characterize play in this way is very disconcerting.  For Caillois to even 
utilize a tiny fraction of means-ended thought to influence his perspective brings us 
to an impasse that perfectly encapsulates the maddening absurdity at the center of 
the play concept.  If we accept Caillois’ premise the question now quickly becomes, 
why engage in any activity if no possible good i.e. utility can become of it?  We know 
sport can’t possibly be a complete waste of time or no one would engage in it over 
ordinary activity; therefore, other factors beyond the benefit of means-ended 
behavior must be operating here.  For, to exist in the play world without any 
possible benefit would be absurd, illogical, and truly devoid of meaning.  Huizinga 
and Caillois are both important for their early exploration of the play concept and 
their respective definitions, but it is my assertion that the best way to understand 
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the meaning of play is to shift from that of analytical formalism to existentialism.  I 
will attempt to prove that play contains existential meaning by viewing the player 
through the lens of an analogous paradoxical absurdity in the myth of Sisyphus.117     
 
3.2 The Myth of Sisyphus 
Albert Camus is one of the philosophers best known for elevating the philosophic 
movement of ‘absurdism.’  Camus’ well-known book, The Myth of Sisyphus, attempts 
to assist humanity in the search for meaning within an absurd world without 
universal truths or values.  The bulk of Camus’ text is unrelated to my purpose as he 
primarily focuses upon the question of suicide, once one is faced with realization of 
the absurd.  Where Camus’ text becomes useful for the purpose at hand, is his final 
chapter, in which he highlights the myth of the text’s namesake that parallels nicely 
with ‘the player.’  We first encounter the myth of Sisyphus by way of the Homeric 
hero Odysseus’ self-report of his return from the underworld Tartarus.118  Known 
among the notorious sinners,119 Sisyphus was a trickster who deceived the gods by 
shackling Thanatos in order to prevent humans from dying.  The Olympian gods 
freed Thanatos from bondage to restore the natural order, and punished Sisyphus 
by banishing him to the underworld, only to escape Hades’ lair shortly thereafter 
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upon using another cunning trick.  After being forcibly returned to the underworld 
by Hermes, Sisyphus is punished by Zeus for his incredible hubris.  
 
3.3 The Absurd within the Play Paradox and the Absurd 
Myth of Sisyphus   
Randolph Feezell follows on the heels of Camus using the myth of Sisyphus, but this 
time for its application to the paradox of playing sport.  Feezell has produced a lot of 
research in the field of philosophy of sport, primarily focusing on the metaphysical 
aspect of sport and ‘the player’s’ thinking within such an arbitrary pursuit.  The 
utilization of the myth of Sisyphus presents a great contrast to the ideas presented 
by Caillois according to Feezell’s analysis of how it relates to sport.120  Sisyphus is 
condemned to the eternal drudgery of ceaselessly pushing a heavy stone to the top 
of a hill, only to see it descend back down, where he must retrieve it and continue 
his endless toil.121  However, it is never explicitly mentioned how Sisyphus 
withstands his punishment in the underworld, only leaving us to imagine how he 
endures while directly confronting his absurd fate.  Sisyphus exists in all eternity as 
proletarian of the gods, powerless in the present and future, due the rebellious 
nature of his past.122 Each time Sisyphus makes his descent down his hill it provides 
him a full appreciation of the extent of his wretched condition.123  Camus asserts 
that it is during that descent to the base of the hill that Sisyphus becomes most 
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interesting and becomes curious.124  Sisyphus parallels nicely with the player due to 
the shared pointlessness in which their tasks are grounded.    
 Feezell underscores the connection between Sisyphus and homo ludens 
through the following analogy, “What is absurd, perhaps, is the incongruity between 
human purposiveness and necessary frustration.”125  Sisyphus’ plight is as one 
whose entire being is exerted towards the accomplishment of nothing, at least in 
terms of progression, because his task is circular.  In order for Feezell to find 
meaning within what appears to be sport’s insignificance, the question he faces 
when invoking Sisyphus, which he doesn’t explicitly ask, takes the following form: 
“Are the player and Sisyphus kindred spirits, and if not, what is difference between 
them”?  This answer possibly holds the key to unlocking fruits of play’s existential 
meaning, while consequently supporting my earlier objection to Caillois’ proposition 
of play being unavailing or a complete waste.  This will be achieved by distilling the 
meaning of the play concept against what appears to be the epitome of 
meaninglessness in Sisyphus.   
 
3.4 Finding Play’s Meaning Through a Contrast with 
Sisyphean Absurdity  
Let us reflect back to Huizinga who doesn’t preclude the possibility of value in the 
play activity, but suggests such value cannot be linked to the ordinary world beyond 
the magic circle.  Caillois leaves himself drastically smaller space in which his 
                                                        
124 Camus, p. 121 
125 Feezell, Sport, Play, and Ethical Reflection. p. 48 
55 
 
definition may operate, since he considered play unproductive and a complete 
waste.  Feezell, and I, would agree that Sisyphus’ drudgery compares nicely to 
Caillois’ characteristic of play because nothing practical becomes of his labor beyond 
further repetition of the same useless task.126  The problem here lies in Caillois’ 
outlook that measures play according to practicality of homo faber.  Perhaps it is not 
unreasonable to suggest play begins similarly to the drudgery of Sisyphus for the 
player, since they complete an unimportant goal relative to the context of quotidian 
life.  However, I am of the opinion that it would be a mistake to liken the absurdity of 
play to being truly identical to the absurdity of Sisyphus’ labour.  Although, it is 
important to point out this comparison provides us better insight in understanding 
that meaning drawn from life, stems only from the intrinsic. 
It should be reiterated that Sisyphus’ labor is a punishment that is 
involuntary, which poses a stark contrast to the voluntary conduct of the player who 
freely engages in play according to the definitions of both Huizinga and Caillois.  Play 
is never constrained or forced, or else the activity wouldn’t be play.127  Sisyphus has 
been stripped of the freedom to choose the unserious activity in which play is 
rooted, rooted for its own sake.  I believe the compulsory nature of his activities in 
the myth represents the nadir of Sisyphus’ life.  The humiliation felt by Sisyphus 
stems from the stripping of his autonomy and self-determination of how he brings 
purpose and fulfillment to his own life.  Instead Zeus the supreme Olympian god 
imposed a punishment on Sisyphus that was essentially the same as fellow 
notorious sinner Prometheus, who is to be bound to a rock suffering passively for all 
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eternity.128  Only, Sisyphus is fettered to his rock, but his sentence is crueler because 
it actively robs him of choice in determining how he is to fulfill his existence as he is 
forced to complete the same task for all eternity.  Yet his task serves as constant 
reminder of the potential of his existence that will be forever wasted in vacuous 
drudgery.  While Zeus has stripped Sisyphus of complete autonomy, he punishes 
him with this useless task because normal punishment typically serves some sort of 
greater utility, where usefulness in itself contains some inherent meaning.  Zeus 
designed the punishment for the exact purpose of robbing Sisyphus of any 
significance he would have enjoyed as result of all his deception as a trickster prior 
to his arrival to Tartarus.129  The irony at the center of Sisyphus’ predicament for the 
Olympian gods rests in the fact that such an incredible task, completed repetitively, 
would cease to bear any meaning when done for all eternity.  Although the 
punishment has been externally imposed upon Sisyphus, he continues in perpetuity 
with no explicit mention of any externally applied pressure beyond that of the 
original command of Zeus.  However, Sisyphus’ punishment does contribute 
meaning to his life while at the base of the hill, when he has full appreciation of the 
absurdity of his predicament.  Sisyphus’ decision to return to his rock, to shoulder 
his burden, suggests intrinsic meaning persists amidst the complete misery shaping 
his existence as he begins his recurring decent from the summit.  It is this assertion 
of the significance of the little enduring intrinsic meaning within Sisyphus that leads 
Camus to his curious conclusion of the book.  Camus suggests crushing truths cease 
to pose a problem when they are acknowledge and opposed.   He goes on to suggest 
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that, “The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his 
victory.”130 When one acknowledges terrible truths, one thereby rises above them. 
I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain! One always finds 
one’s burden again.  But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that 
negates the gods and raises rocks.  He too concludes that all is well.  
This universe henceforth without a master seems to him neither 
sterile nor futile.  Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that 
night filled mountain, in itself forms a world.  The struggle itself 
toward the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart.  One must imagine 
Sisyphus happy.131   
 
Play has similarities to the form of Sisyphus’ punishment with respect to the 
insignificance of the task undertaken; however, both contain intrinsic meaning for 
most individuals involved.  Most sport games that are played are dedicated to 
accomplishing what is a rather monotonous task, only in an extraordinary way!  
Consider the parallel of the marathoner or long distance swimmer with Sisyphus.  
There is no reason for them to traverse a road course or body of water with the 
advent of automobile and nautical transportation.  There actions are on par with the 
level of uselessness of those of Sisyphus, but their reasons for engaging in such 
conduct differ completely.  Therefore, I posit that playing in the realm of sport is 
simply a heightened sense of intrinsic meaning to the player, due to the imaginative 
component that is the distinguishing factor between the two endeavors.  However, 
the important concept of volition is critical in the juxtaposition of Sisyphus’ 
drudgery with the amusement of the player.  One primary difference between the 
two absurdities rests in the fact Sisyphus’ labor is interminable, while the player’s 
‘play’ is not.  When a player voluntarily engages in a game he or she does so while 
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observing the rules designed to bring about some end or final goal due to the 
meaningfulness of choosing that pursuit.  I am suggesting that playful activities take 
on a clear meaning by virtue of choosing the very rule system internal to a specific 
play sphere.  Therefore, obvious intrinsic meaning results from the players’ deep 
vested personal interests in that particular form of ‘play’ and the way they embrace 
their embodiment accordingly.   
Coupled with the concept of choice, is the fact of play’s temporary nature, 
which is wholly different from Sisyphus’ toil.  Feezell also points out that the 
decision to choose the rules that generate Huizinga’s concept of the magic circle 
presents a critical structural element to play that Sisyphus’ toil doesn’t have, 
namely, a conclusion.  Play activities are purposive insofar as they are oriented 
toward the ends internal to the play world, and they lead toward a 
consummation.132  In the world of Sisyphus there can be no consummation because 
there is no final end to his toil.  This teleological aspect of play gives meaning to the 
activities that lead toward a specific end in view, or a cloudy indeterminate one.  The 
fact that an end exists is another fundamental difference between homo ludens and 
Sisyphus, because without it consummation is impossible.133  Play, according to 
Feezell, especially when occurring in the form of the contest, is a quest with 
purpose, ending in fulfillment of Caillois’ ludic prescriptions.134  Thus, being able to 
freely exist, and choose how you arrive at the desired end one seeks, is central to the 
heightened intrinsic value of play.  Although, I agree with the suggestion that ‘play’ is 
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considered absurd, it must not be thought so by virtue of an exact analogy with the 
absurdity of Sisyphus’ plight.135  Absurdity in the ‘play’ form contains heightened 
meaning for the individual.  While it is also true that intrinsic value is not a concept 
completely lost onto Sisyphus; therefore he still experiences such value in the face of 
the absurd when he returns to his task.  It is in this point where Feezell and I begin 
to diverge.  Feezell believes absurdity doesn’t translate to meaningless within play, a 
premise to which I agree.  However, he sees no intrinsic value within Sisyphus’ 
toil.136  Therefore, Feezell views the analogy as an inexact parallel of sorts, where I 
view it as especially apt from the standpoint distinguishing the heightened intrinsic 
meaning of play amidst the absurdity of a unique concept in sport.          
Richard Taylor, another prominent philosopher who dealt with the question 
of the meaning of life using the myth of Sisyphus, would certainly agree with 
Feezell’s point regarding an activity’s culmination.  Consider Taylor’s remark from 
Good and Evil,  
Meaninglessness is essentially endless pointlessness, and 
meaningfulness is therefore the opposite.  Activity, and even long, 
protracted, repetitive activity has a meaning if it has some 
culmination, some more or less lasting end that can be considered to 
have been the direction and purpose of the activity.137  
 
 This passage becomes clearer when considering play, according to Caillois’ 
play continuum, as activities progress toward the Ludus end of the spectrum.  The 
following expressions capture the difference between homo ludens and Sisyphus 
perfectly: “just finish the race,” “giving a competitor one’s best effort,” or “leaving it 
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all out on the field for your teammates.”  Such statements possess a decided element 
of finality, indicating the momentary nature of sport, due to existence of choice and 
freedom within play, with which, both Taylor and Feezell would agree.  Along with 
this sense of finality, I believe we gain a productive element, at least intrinsically.  If 
the decision to play stems from an intrinsic choice, play need not serve any external 
or tangible appetite according to our earlier definitions.138   It becomes rewarding 
emotionally, psychologically, and spiritually because it is the ultimate expression of 
freedom to direct one’s will towards self-actualization in the form believed to carry 
the most meaning for the individual.  
Ultimately, we must return our focus to Caillois and the claim suggesting play 
is unproductive. Play throughout the entire range of Caillois’ spectrum contains 
intrinsic good available simply by undertaking the playful activity.  However, Caillois 
correctly points out, playful activity exists on a continuum because the nature of the 
play experience resonates quite differently between individuals and, hence, the 
slight difference of the activity in our introductory example of Suzy (tee-ball) and 
Ken Griffey (MLB), despite what may be similar intrinsic motivation felt by each.  
This is why play cannot be considered a single homogenous thing that Huizinga 
proposed.139 I believe there are similarities between hide-and-go seek, playing tag, 
playing catch, baseball, rowing, and even gladiatorial combat, but the experience of 
playing each of them is not completely identical.  Each game possesses a distinct 
combination of game elements previously described by Caillois, which shape the 
player’s unique playing experience.  Certain values inherent within each activity 
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resonate with a person’s particular stage of development, interests, experiences that 
contribute to a very meaningful mode of achieving self-actualization defined by the 
individual’s free choice and the teleological nature of the activity.  Each stage of 
growth as result of this transformative experience, in itself, demonstrates the value 
of play.  Such personal value is of a different sort than what I suspect Caillois 
intended in his definition by using the word “useless.”  Nonetheless, I believe I have 
established that a element unique to the individual is central to the play concept 
within the heart of every person truly ‘playing’ sports.    
 Using the work of Feezell and Taylor, it has been established that a 
connection between freedom of choice and intrinsic significance lies at the heart 
play’s meaning.  The analogy between homo ludens and Sisyphus is once again 
tremendously helpful for evaluating the significance of play stemming from the 
original characteristics outlined by Huizinga and Caillois.  Homo ludens and Sisyphus 
approach their respective activities from oddly similar perspectives within their 
own hearts.  Homo ludens chooses to freely engage in play when accomplishing 
something rather insignificant, while Sisyphus continually perseveres while 
essentially bound to his rock.  Sisyphus lives a completely inconsequential existence 
for all eternity, undertaking what is thought to be an intrinsically meaningless task, 
but is truly extrinsically meaningless.   However, it should be pointed out that 
although he did not choose to be condemned to such a miserable existence, he 
invests himself in shouldering his burden like the player does his task.   The outlook 
each carries toward his task is of the utmost importance, for suppose that Sisyphus 
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wanted to do what he is, in fact, doomed forever to do by necessity.140  Sisyphus’ 
task would be pleasurable as oppose to baneful because his task would match his 
desires.  However, the purpose of his task bears meaning only through fulfilling it as 
a form of punishment.  Sisyphus realizes the absurdity, but escapes its hold.  
Although he is not able to freely choose, he continually approaches his rock with 
effort and resolve knowing it contributes to his eternal torment, which certifies him 
as the absurd hero.141  Camus ultimately uses the myth of Sisyphus to imply that the 
only meaning that can be drawn from our lives is of the intrinsic variety, since 
extrinsic meaning can’t be gained while immersed in an absurd pursuit e.g. sports.  
Camus’ example of suicide, and also what I would describe as a general 
unwillingness to accept the absurdity of one’s circumstance, disagrees with the 
characteristics of the ideal player.   
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Chapter 4: Balancing Both Sides of the Player 
4.1 The Absurdity of Homo Ludens   
What makes Sisyphus the archetype of the absurd life is the gap between his desires 
and the reality of his activity; he is burdened with attitudes inconsistent with his 
situation.142  It is difficult for Feezell to conceive of something objectively absurd, 
because the absurd seems to be a function of wills, desires, and interests.143  The 
player’s intrinsic purpose changes his understanding as he enters the play sphere, 
allowing him to incorporate a serious attitude to the trivial.   Therefore, his play 
seems wholly contradictory to the endless drudgery of Sisyphus from the standpoint 
of attitude, despite carrying out a nearly identical task with respect to means-ended 
significance.  Yet, this difference exposes the fundamental tension between the 
player’s serious attitude and the reality of the true insignificance of playfulness in 
the ordinary world for Feezell.  Feezell highlights the dynamic between two 
inconsistent attitudes that define the play sphere.  “Unlike Sisyphus, the player 
regards his activity as if it were truly significant, but, like Sisyphus, the player really 
does come up empty handed.”144  Nothing tangible comes of play, and the player 
only consciously recognizes that play is really unserious subsequent to the 
dissolution of the magic circle.  When in play the player momentarily transcends 
quotidian life to enter Huizinga’s consecrated magic circle, which has its own 
meanings and prescriptions.  The freedom of play suggests that we voluntarily 
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bracket our ordinary and pressing concerns as we take a stance outside the practical 
affairs of life.145  Recall one of Huizinga’s essential characteristics of play:  
Play is not ordinary or real life.  It is rather a stepping out of real life 
into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all its own.  The 
essence of play comes into existence through a decision to play.  Such 
a constitutive decision cannot be compelled and is essentially free.  
Through it arises the suspension of the ordinary concerns of the 
everyday world.  Such a decision does not simply initiate the playing 
but rather constitutes it.”146   
 
Thus according to Feezell, one might see the positive aspect of play as 
transcendence of worldly constraint in the free projection of alternative 
possibilities.147  This separation from the ordinary lends a peculiar flavor to play, for 
it is a withdrawal from those things normally associated with the seriousness of life.  
Like the make-believe play of children, there arises a sense of unreality associated 
with the play world.  This make-believe aspect betrays a consciousness of the 
inferiority of play compared with the seriousness, a feeling that seems to be 
something as primary as play itself.148 Although homo ludens is charged with tasks 
seemingly insignificant, the attitude of homo ludens presents a curious paradox.149  
Homo ludens’ behavior is not in keeping with a frivolous attitude typically expected 
of one when completing such an impractical task.  Homo ludens’ actions within the 
magic circle point to the contrary; therefore, play is undertaken with utmost 
seriousness, with an absorption, a devotion that passes into rapture and, 
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temporarily at least, completely abolishes that troublesome temporary feeling.150  A 
certain abandon goes along with the freedom to play.  So we arrive at a curious 
dialectic within the experience of play, between the idea of it being unserious, yet 
also simultaneously profoundly serious.  We play our games with abandon and 
intensity as if nothing in this challenge mattered more than making the basket, 
winning the game, or overcoming a challenge.   
When the attitude of homo ludens is contrasted with the means-ended human 
nature outlined in the introduction, one can gain a better appreciation of the 
absurdity at the center of ‘play’.  Recall Feezell’s account of the absurd in the 
instance of ‘play’ as:  
A conspicuous discrepancy between pretension or aspiration and 
reality.  The player must at one and the same time embrace the 
seemingly contradictory attitudes that their play world is a fiction, 
their commitment to the arbitrary rules of the game is gratuitous; 
yet they must play as if it really mattered, because their decision to 
play necessitates such commitment. Without commitment, he really 
isn’t playing, but with commitment, the play sphere becomes the 
solitary focus of the player despite its trivial purpose overall. In the 
form of the play contest, the absence of commitment descends the 
game into mere frolic completely killing the framework designed to 
bring about aim to the activity.  Thomas Nagel stated the following 
about the absurdity of life as a whole, “We always have available a 
point of view outside the particular form of our lives, from which the 
seriousness appears gratuitous.”  This situation is precisely seen in 
play, because of the bracketing of the ordinary and the creation of a 
play sphere with its own internal aspects of time, and space. The 
always available point of view outside the play world is, of course, 
the standpoint of the ordinary world that generates the criteria for 
what we take as really serious.  Whenever we say “it’s only a game” 
we acknowledge this ability to detach ourselves from the immediate 
participation in play, yet this doesn’t mean that we will not play 
seriously, just as the recognition of the absurd doesn’t mean that we 
will henceforth fail to take anything in life seriously.  Therefore, to 
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speak of play as absurd describes this structure or dialectic.  The 
absurdity of play describes the incongruous collision between the 
single-minded aspiration of the player and nature of play that 
undermines the seriousness of the pursuit.  Regardless of whether 
Nagel is right about life as a whole, the absurdity involved in game 
playing is apparent through the player’s mediation of two 
antithetical truisms that comprise the duality of spirited play.151  
 
 
4.2 Playful Irony  
Feezell’s passage requires us to revisit Huizinga and Caillois from the standpoint of 
Thomas Nagel’s well-known concept the “view from nowhere.”  Nagel highlights that 
humans have the capability of thinking about the world from a standpoint that 
transcends personal experience.  It is this particular perspective Nagel describes as 
the “view from nowhere.”152  Simultaneously, each person carries his or her own 
deeply personal views about the world that contribute to his or her own 
understanding of the world, but don’t constitute it.  How we reconcile these 
divergent perceptions is fundamental to progressing to a more nuanced 
understanding of the ‘play’ concept.  Nagel’s concept allows us to build upon 
analysis of earlier play theorists.  Huizinga’s previous assertion that sports are non-
seriousness is an incomplete truth.  A literal understanding of Huizinga’s point is 
simple-minded and fails to truly represent the complexity or depth of play.  Homo 
ludens must temper his deep subjective interests and passions with a conflicting 
sense of objectivity and frivol.  One can find further clarity within the ‘play’ concept 
when considering the dualistic attitude central to ‘play.’  I believe it is important to 
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point out that Huizinga didn’t mean ‘play’ completely lacks seriousness, otherwise 
he would have used the strongest possible prefix ‘not.’  While Huizinga 
demonstrates considerable foresight in this capacity, Caillois seems to stumble into 
a conceptual rut through the indirect comparison with homo faber.  Characterizing 
‘play’ as unproductive, or a waste, also implies that it is tantamount to a completely 
useless means-ended pursuit, or not being a serious endeavour whatsoever within 
the grand scheme of things.  ‘Play’ is not means-ended because Huizinga clearly 
established that ‘play’ is self-serving.  Therefore, the interpretation of Caillois’ point 
on the unproductivity of play suggests his evaluation of ‘play’ fails to appreciate the 
duality of the ‘play’ concept.  The contention that ‘play’ is not serious would seem to 
demonstrate Caillois’ failure to understand the ontological nature of ‘play’ itself.  
Feezell notes that there is something deeply ironic about the attitude of the 
player.153  Within structured sport approaching the Ludus range of Caillois’ 
spectrum, the player must attempt to balance the serious aspirations and reality in 
an especially precarious way.  Feezell uses Nagel’s concept of “the view from 
nowhere” to explain ‘play’s’ tricky duality.  He cites the trouble with play and 
seriousness is determining, “How to combine the perspective of a particular person 
inside the world with an objective view of the same world, the person and the 
viewpoint included.”154  The play sphere is created and maintained by a set of 
internal prescriptions dictating the pursuit of an ultimate aim.  Players, more often 
than not, lose themselves and their focus on the importance of the ordinary world 
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beyond the ‘play’ sphere, especially during the crucial points of a contest when 
athletic drama is unfolding.155  The situation described above represents a deeply 
subjective one, based on understanding of the world normally present within the 
“poor sport.”  The flaw inherent to poor sports is that their subjective experience in 
the play sphere seems completely isolated from the effects of an objective 
viewpoint, which is particularly glaring upon the recognition of play’s triviality.  This 
is similarly viewed upon as absurd because it represents, “The collision between the 
seriousness with which we take our lives and the perpetual possibility of regarding 
everything about which we are serious as arbitrary, or open to doubt.”156  Therefore, 
we must accord playful activity the requisite seriousness in order to maintain its 
possibility, while also demonstrating awareness of the ordinary which envelopes 
the temporary ‘play’ sphere.  To become too serious about play would negate the 
trivial nature of the situation, while an utter lack of sincerity in the activity, 
eliminates its possibility.   
To this point Feezell has established the absurdity of ‘play’.  He also provides 
another important but overlooked characteristic of play, by way of Nagel.  The ‘play’ 
of homo ludens is both trivial and absurd when considering Nagel’s concept of ‘the 
view from nowhere.’  The player must appreciate the trivial and absurd for what 
they are, characteristics sine qua non to the play spirit.  Recognition of this unique 
perspective is a precondition to the constitution of the player and transforms the 
ontological nature of the activity from work to ‘play.’  Therefore, the ideal player 
participates while guided by the spirit of ‘play.’  This state exists in the kind of 
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golden mean used by Aristotle to determine virtue between two extreme character 
traits.157  In the case of play, a precarious balance must be achieved between the 
excesses of seriousness, and frivolousness, for the player to the have a sense of the 
play spirit.158  The right combination of means-ended purpose, tempered by 
frivolity, allows both characteristics to coalesce and form the athletic ironist.159  
Playing ironically can be best described as:  
An awareness of the paradoxical nature of an activity as competitive 
play in the form of serious nonseriousness, or nonserious 
seriousness.  Irony is an attitude that embraces the basic incongruity 
of our devotions to triviality, our celebration of absurdity every time 
we compete intensely and play games seriously.160             
 
             Our contemporary understanding of play is not so nuanced, nor does it seem 
to have any sort of dynamic structure.  Playing sport, contemporarily, is best 
understood from the excessive end of one character trait.  There is a gross 
oversimplification of the fluidity of the ‘play’ experience, and we have seemingly 
limited the range of possible emotions to be experienced by approaching ‘play’ with 
such a parochial scope.  This is best understood as a ‘play’ paradigm that exists 
through our society’s common maxims about ‘play’, which contribute to our ongoing 
misunderstanding of sport.  This is primarily due to capturing sport as a simplified 
concept and negating its nuanced nature within the following examples by Feezell.  
 Consider the ironic stance of the player in the famous Vince 
Lombardi remark, “Winning is not the most important thing: it’s the 
only thing.”  Yet conversely there is another famous truism, “It’s not 
whether you win or lose, but how you play the game,” as if play was 
merely the instrument of moral education.  Finally, it would also 
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abuse the irony of the play attitude to emphasize entirely the 
intrinsic value of play to the exclusion of a serious pursuit of an end, 
“It’s not whether you win or lose, but that you play the game.”  All of 
these are only partial truths that overemphasize one side of the 
dialectic.  Play is serious, but unreal.  You must have it both ways 
otherwise it ceases to be play.161   
 
4.3 Contrasting the Absurd with the Analytical Formalist 
Account of Play 
I believe the idea that led Feezell to the concept of ‘playful irony,’ serves as an 
excellent basis to further refine the accounts of Huizinga and Caillois.  Needless to 
say, Huizinga was essentially correct as his non-serious characteristic acknowledges 
the middle ground existing between ordinary seriousness and frivolousness in 
different, but similar, terms.  While I should point out that the more nuanced 
account of play suggests Caillois was wrong to claim that play is an utter waste.  The 
implication of such meaninglessness fails to recognize the duality previously 
explained.  In being fair, by putting Caillois’ remark within the proper context of 
defending humanity’s right to play; his observation certainly isn’t meant 
pejoratively.  However, it seriously fails to represent play as something beyond 
diversion, quite possibly the ultimate sense of perspective toward life.  Esteemed 
writer, philosopher, and theologian, Michael Novack shares an opinion that I 
support, that playing sports carries significance extending beyond that of a 
capricious diversion.  Similar to Meier’s beliefs on play, Novack suggests a stark 
contrast between means-ended and playful behavior that shapes one’s outlook.      
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Play, not work, is the end of life.  To participate in the rites of 
play is to dwell in the Kingdom of Ends.  To participate in work, 
career, and the making of history is to labor in the Kingdom of 
Means.  The modern age, the age of history, nourishes illusions.  In a 
protestant culture, as in Marxist cultures, work is serious, important, 
and adult.  Its essential significance is overlooked.  Work, of course, 
must be done, but we should be wise enough to distinguish necessity 
from reality.  Play is reality, work is diversion and escape.162  
  
My final objection towards these earlier accounts of the ‘play’ concept 
pertains to their proposed mutual exclusivity between play and material interests.  
This problem poses greater difficulties with Caillois’ proposal of the ‘play’ spectrum 
than it does Huizinga.  Caillois effectively reasons that games of chance exist, but 
external goods aren’t produced by the activity but, rather, only redistributed.  Thus, 
helping to maintain the separation of goods as originally conceived by Huizinga.  
Creating a binary utilizing external reward as a criterion to differentiate between 
play and non-play generates troubling logical inconsistencies.  If a characteristic of 
play indeed dictates that no wealth or good can be created, this would now make the 
distinction between professional and amateur irreconcilable.  Caillois asserts, “As 
for professional it is clear that they are not players but workers.  When they ‘play,’ it 
is at some other game.”163  When considering this problem the question becomes 
whether an external element, such as extrinsic reward for participants, 
fundamentally changes the nature of the activity from something resembling play 
towards something that should be considered work?  The most salient difference 
between the professional and sincere player is the external motivation driving 
participation.  Participating under these conditions transforms ‘play,’ turning what 
                                                        
162 Michael Novak. The Joy of Sport (Basic Books: New York, 1976), p. 40   
163 Caillois, p. 6 
72 
 
was once an escape, into obligation, guided by compulsion.164  Caillois doesn’t seem 
to harbor as much inherent cynicism towards the professional as he considers sport 
to retain most of its isolated, regulated, and formal characteristics when players are 
paid.165  As we can see, in the case of Caillois, framing the debate of sport’s moral 
fiber around the question of professionalism and amateurism is misguided and 
leads to logical problems when reflected upon with the understanding of sport’s 
metaphysical nature. 
Huizinga and Caillois both seem to believe that external motivation can 
override the intrinsic nature of ‘play’ and, hence, the mutual exclusivity both ascribe 
to their own definition of ‘play.’  This is not necessarily true, as seen in the case of 
“flow” studied by Czikszentmihalyi.166  Flow is thought to be the perfect harmony 
between the player and the ‘play’ sphere when such a player singularly focuses upon 
the ultimate aim of the play activity.167  The player truly enters the suspended time 
and space of the magic circle, unaware and completely detached from the realities of 
the ordinary.  Flow is a state within the ‘play’ experience unmatched that we all 
strive toward, but seldom achieve.  Nonetheless, it can be achieved at any level of 
sport, ranging from the professional to simple forms.  An activity that makes the 
flow experience possible must be challenging, and the level of the game required to 
create the flow experience will improve as the player becomes more and more 
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skilled.168  The difference between the professional and amateur is the external 
consequence of participation, not the quality of the ‘play’ experience.  The idea of 
flow seems to debunk the idea of separation of external goods from the magic circle, 
because there are countless examples of professionals in ‘flow.’  I contend that these 
professionals are locked into a performance and not ‘play.’  By completing such 
skillful activity one can be experiencing something similar to flow when locked into 
the challenge of the tasks.  They are not ‘playing’ but just achieving in goal-oriented 
form.  In some ways flow represents the pinnacle of ‘play.’  If this is the case, it 
becomes extremely difficult to distinguish between the goals of the professional and 
amateur within the magic circle.  
Despite the fact that flow is the pinnacle play experience shared by 
professionals and sincere players at their apex; the drastic shift in mindset towards 
means-ended conduct presents the fundamental problem.  Something that was 
previously done for pleasure as an escape can become an obsession and 
obligation.169  This shift in mindset towards means-ended conduct occurs when the 
universe of play is infringed upon by the real world.   Essentially, assigning real 
consequences to trivial and playful acts, which results in the corruption of ‘play.’  
The player is truly practicing a profession where they may experience flow.  The 
existence of external goods don’t change the game, or the magic circle, for those 
involved; they fundamentally changes the player’s attitude to the point that he no 
longer plays but practices a profession.  This is due to the omnidirectional means-
ended approach infiltrating the consecrated space dedicated to the former players’ 
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free pursuit of the play activity.  Without the free inconsequential nature of the 
activity there exists, an extreme compulsion to win because the means-ended 
approach dictates such a singular pursuit.  As we will come to find out in the next 
chapter, such a compulsion is wholly incompatible with the tenets of these early 
forms of ‘play’.   
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Chapter 5 Interrelationship of the Trio 
5.1 Relationship of Play and Game 
Defining the nature of play and its relationship within the ‘tricky triad’ represents 
the initial step in clarifying the process of drawing meaning from ‘playing’ sport.  
After Huizinga and Caillois produced workable definitions of what constitutes ‘play,’ 
it became important to consider the configurations that facilitate and foster ‘play,’  
Caillois quickly touched upon the common example of games in his four-category 
typology outlined in Man, Play and Games.  However, Caillois doesn’t provide an 
account of the essence of ‘games’ like he does for the nature of play, where he 
specifically outlines the characteristics that delimit ‘play.’  Consequently, we are able 
to identify who can be involved in ‘play’, what its constitution is, when it occurs, and 
where it takes place.  Games don’t appear to follow the same model of necessary and 
sufficient conditions upon first glance.  The category of ‘game’ contains a great deal 
of variability on the surface.  Oftentimes Caillois’ games seem completely dissimilar 
when contrasted to other games that fit within the broader ‘game’ category.  For 
instance, Chinese checkers and Bocce ball are both considered games, but they 
vastly differ outside of the competitive structure that provide purpose to the 
concept of a ‘game.’  The competitive nature of both games appears to be the shared 
structural characteristic between ‘game’ and ‘sport.’  It seems quite possible that 
‘game’ and ‘sport’ share the same necessary and sufficient conditions; however, 
‘game’ encompasses a broader scope while ‘sport’ is more narrowly defined.      
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The concept of ‘play’ represents the most extensive range of possibility; 
therefore, it can be observed in most instances and appears to be common to both 
sports and games.  Games are the logical choice to continue this paradigm because 
they encompass a greater range of possible examples, whereas, what could be 
considered sport is quite limited, even with the most liberal of sporting opinions.  
This sort of understanding differentiates the three concepts on a sort of continuum.  
In the context of mapping this relationship, the position of sport and games is 
determined simply by how often each concept can be recognized as part of human 
activity.  ‘Play’ is completely different from games and sports because ‘play’ arises 
spontaneously and is not a constructed system unlike ‘game’ and ‘sport,’ that are 
contrived to bring about a type of play identified by Caillois.  Therefore, we must 
clarify whether ‘game’ and ‘sport’ are concepts related by core similarities in their 
constitution, but distinguished by particular surface details; or, are they progressive 
variations emerging from the genus of ‘play’ to more specialized and distinct 
categories.  Meier, at first, suggests the three exist on a continuum transitioning in 
the order of Play-Games-Sport.170  Without a precise definition of the essence of 
sports and games, the question of what true ‘play’ is within ‘sport’ cannot be 
answered.  The answer to this question of definition and the exact relationship with 
play is examined in Bernard Suits’ book The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia as 
a response of sorts to the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations.  Suits’ definition brings ‘game’ into the light, further away from what 
he sees as the amorphous understanding of Wittgenstein, demonstrating its 
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undeniable connection to foundational play characteristics.  However, Suits 
proposes his own refinements to the play definition.  From this perspective we can 
begin to more accurately identify what games are and their place in the tricky triad.  
From Suits’ position on play and games we can better analyze and produce a 
definition of playing sport amongst sport philosophers. 
   
5.2 Forming a Revised Definition of Play 
It is Suits’ belief that Huizinga was essentially correct when he formulated the first 
definition of play.  However, Suits attempts to strengthen the play definition by 
adding the qualification of ‘autotelicity,’ and delimiting it to the specific instances of 
‘play’ in order to truly have a working concept of it.171  Suits explained the nature of 
autotelicty existed entirely with the process not output.  “Autotelic activities are 
activities which are ends in themselves.”172 Autotelicity is simply a greater standard 
for the separation of the ‘play’ environment from the surrounding ordinary.  These 
practices are done simply because they are good in themselves and serve no other 
end but themselves.  Suits suggests that all instances of ‘play’ are instances of 
autotelic activity.173  However, he views autotelicity as a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition, for an adequate definition of ‘play.’174  Ultimately, Suits must 
conclude that ‘play’ and ‘game’ are logically distinct because of the separate 
definitions he has created for both concepts.  The commonly held view of ‘game’ as a 
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species of ‘play’ is incorrect.  Play is its own concept that certainly influences ‘games’ 
in a capacity, but it is important to understand that it is distinct from ‘game’ and 
‘sport.’    
 When we use the word ‘play’ we don’t always limit it to its proper context 
and far too often attribute it to other concepts, which adds to the heightened 
confusion of the term.  For example, Suits outlines that we commonly use the word 
play as an infinitive to describe things like performing with a violin, and operating a 
pinball machine.175  The cross application of the word is unique because we don’t 
lose any parts of the original meaning when used outside of it proper context.176  
This similarly applies to participation and playing a game.  The existence of the 
expression ‘playing a game’ is not by itself a compelling reason for insisting that 
there is logical relation between playing and game-playing.177   
 Consider Suits’ example of Johnny and his conduct while eating dinner.178  It 
wouldn’t be out of the ordinary to hear Johnny’s mom instruct him to stop playing 
with his mashed potatoes.  Describing Johnny’s conduct as ‘play’ is completely 
within reason.  However, defining it as game-play or a game while sitting in for 
family dinner seems nonsensical.179  Without the elements of game Suits had 
originally outlined, Johnny’s playful conduct doesn’t meet criteria of ‘game.’  It could 
only be described as a primitive realm of ‘play.’  Conversely, in the opposite situation 
of a game, it appears implausible for everyone to be truly playing.  When Huizinga 
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mentions the rise of the professional who plays sports for pay, we are not all 
inclined to conclude from that fact, that they are without qualification, playing.180  
Thomas Hurka, utilizes Suits’ theory to conclude that being involved in a game 
doesn’t constitute ‘playing.’ One simply must follow the rules to remain within the 
limits of the game in order to game-play.  They need not accept rules for their own 
sake, just simply to make the activity possible.181  Hence, when contrasting the 
professional athletes participation in sport alongside more innocent activities like 
playing with their own kids, only the latter seems to truly represent ‘play.’  The 
distinction here is best understood when the two are contrasted; therefore, Suits 
describes play and game-play as dependently identifiable.182 
 Suits supports his assertion of logical independence by suggesting, 
 The word play is used to designate the kind of thing Johnny does 
with his mashed potatoes when he is not getting down to the serious 
business of eating them, what is being designated is the kind of thing 
that is inherently relative to something else, but that game, when it is 
used to refer to such things as chess and basketball, is not.183 
  
 Play is understood primarily through comparisons with its opposite, seriousness, 
while ‘game’ doesn’t appear to have an opposite counterpart.  If we reflect back to 
Suits’ example of Johnny, it appears that play carries the implication that mashed 
potatoes (in this instance) are involved in purposes foreign, to or inconsistent with, 
the way they are being utilized.184  Following Johnny’s dinner fun, he can also engage 
in play by going outside where he can do all sorts of amusing things.  This play 
                                                        
180Suits, “Words on Play,” p. 120 
181 Thomas Hurka, “Games and the Good,” W.J. Morgan et al. (Eds.) Ethics in Sport 
Champaign: Human Kinetics. (2007), p. 26 
182 Suits, “Words on Play,” p. 120 
183 Ibid p. 120 
184 Ibid p. 121 
80 
 
seems different because Johnny has no instruments, but one detail remains 
unchanged.  Johnny’s behavior is autotelic, or done simply for its own sake and not 
any other.  Play is concerned with the use of resources for which those resources 
were not initially intended, where the original allocation was for instrumental 
activities and now the new allocation is for autotelic activities.185  From this Suits 
formulates a revised definition of play: “x is playing if and only if x has made a 
temporary reallocation to autotelic activities of resources primarily committed to 
instrumental purposes.”186         
        If we revisit the case of Johnny’s post dinner play time, it isn’t 
immediately obvious what resource he is using by just frolicking in the yard.  The 
resource need not only be instrumental, but one resource is common to all things 
and that is time.187  As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, humans have a 
finite period of time, primarily used for the accomplishment of something 
worthwhile to the civilization or bettering it in some capacity.  The concept of time 
is integral to play because means-ended pursuits are considered to be prioritized 
over autotelic play.  Play only seems reasonable when time exists in a surplus, which 
is the case for kids, because they generally don’t do much that’s considered 
constructive with the time they have.  However, adults understand the preciousness 
of time and the ridiculousness of wasting it and, hence, why excessive play can be 
viewed as absurd upon reaching a certain age of one’s life.  Therefore play is 
dependent upon the context of time when it is pursued as outlined by Suits.      
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There are conditions under which it is proper to call various kinds of 
aesthetic enjoyment play: not however, merely because they are 
intrinsically valued pursuits, but because of the conditions under 
which such intrinsically valued activities are pursued.  The 
conditions must be such that the time used for such pursuits is 
viewed in contrast to a situation in which that time ought to be used 
for an activity which has a higher claim upon it.188             
  
5.3 Wittgenstein versus Suits on Games                 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is a book unrelated to sport philosophy, 
but is significant because of his claims regarding the status of conceptual analysis of 
language and semantics.    Wittgenstein asserts that some concepts like games don’t 
have the determinate characteristics or sharp edges that conceptual analysis 
requires for arriving at a precise definition.189  Wittgenstein suggests you don’t need 
necessary and sufficient conditions to discover the essence of games because they 
are linked only by a looser set of family resemblances.190  In other words, 
Wittgenstein argues against the idea of concrete definitions as it pertains to 
language and semantics.  In order to prove his thesis of non-essential conditions 
correct, Wittgenstein provides an example in games that he believes to be in 
agreement with his reasoning.  Using the example of games Wittgenstein posits, 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”.  I mean 
board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, and so on.  
What is common to them all?  Don’t say: There must be something 
common, or they would not be called games but look and see 
whether there is anything common to all.  For if you look at them you 
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will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that.191  
 
 Wittgenstein observes elements that exist within some games, but vanish 
from others.  The nature of ball games differs completely from the standpoint of 
requisite skill in chess, yet both are considered to be among the same classification 
in ‘game.’  Despite being more informal, tic-tac-toe requires some analytical skills 
similar to chess but lacks any sort of physical coordination.  Last, a simple game of 
rock, paper, scissors doesn’t require physical skills or analytical skills; otherwise, 
instead it is predicated entirely on luck.  If one is correct in identifying all the 
pursuits above as games, despite their disparate workings, they can rely on 
Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘family resemblance.’  Instead of possessing a clear-cut 
characteristic, ‘games’ have a network of overlapping similarities.  Consider the 
various resemblances between family members possessing distinct characteristics 
that aren’t completely uniform, but possess enough similarity that they can be 
grouped as a family.192  Therefore, surface elements like ‘playfulness’ and ‘contest’ 
create the definition according to Wittgenstein.  Ultimately, games have the same 
qualities and cannot be completely atomized.       
 Bernard Suits account of ‘game’ directly opposes Wittgenstein’s principal 
argument in Philosophical Investigations.  Suits posits a framework that attempts to 
identify the necessary and sufficient conditions that comprise a game, the very thing 
Wittgenstein pronounced as impossible.  Wittgenstein only notes the surface 
differences between games in his example without even wondering whether they 
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may not be consistent with deeper commonality.193  In The Grasshopper Suits 
constructs an ironclad argument proving the analysis of Wittgenstein incorrect, 
while identifying the components that define a game’s structure and the nature of 
‘game-play’ and playing games.  
 Suits begins The Grasshopper by underscoring the dichotomous relationship 
between games and work.  Within this distinction lies a difference in the attitude 
with which one approaches the respective endeavour.  Since work revolves around 
practicality, the worker will endeavour to use the most efficient means possible to 
complete the goal.194  Conversely, the means chosen by the player are not of similar 
efficiency, but complete inefficiency.195  Suits uses the especially apt example of golf 
to prove the idea of inefficiency in game.  Ultimately, the goal is to get the golf ball in 
the designated hole, but a practical worker would simply walk over and place the 
ball in the hole to fulfill this task. 196 In contrast, we see that we employ truly 
inefficient means when playing golf.  We use a variety of clubs that are impractical 
when compared with the former means of the worker.  Compounding the 
inefficiency of the means employed, is the fact that getting the ball in the hole 
doesn’t constitute the entire goal of the activity.197  One must also use the least 
number of strokes accomplishing this goal, as oppose to simply completing the task 
quickest.198  Such a restriction requires calculated precision and forethought from 
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the player, unlike the worker who uses efficiency to remove such an unnecessary 
burden.  The inefficient means become legislated through the rules governing the 
activity making them paramount to the game’s structure.  Suit’s asserts that value 
exist in the process not output.  “Rules in games thus seem to be in some sense 
inseparable from ends, for to break a game rule is to render impossible the 
attainment of an end.”199  Therefore, the completion of game activity cannot be 
considered independent of the means used to arrive at that end.  The mode one 
chooses is equally, if not more, important then the end itself.  Doing the task in the 
inefficient manner prescribed creates the possibility of the activity, not just 
completing the end task.  In the example of billiards, one cannot begin 
indiscriminately shooting balls at one’s own convenience.  Although sinking the 
billiard balls, resembles the task the player is charged with in a billiards game, it 
can’t be classified as a true game of billiards. The inefficiency of dealing with 
impediments and sinking the eight ball defines billiards.  Without these elements, it 
could still be a form of billiards, but not the true game as constituted, according to 
Suits.      
 The definition of games isn’t solely comprised of the inefficiency constituted 
by the rules.  An additional aspect of motivation, to freely comply with the rules, is 
just as important, if not more so than the proscriptions themselves according to 
Suits.  Suits proposes that the player obeys the rules just because such obedience is 
a necessary condition for engaging in the activity; and such obedience allows the 
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game to become possible.200  Citing the example of high jump, Suits explains that 
high jumpers don’t employ any type of means to cross the barrier but choose to 
restrict themselves to the method used to do so voluntarily.201  Suit’s views the value 
of ‘playing’ games from the standpoint of the process.  Their reason for accepting 
such rules is just because they want to act within the limitations of the rules 
imposed.  They accept rules so that they can play a game, and they accept these rules 
so that they can play this game.202  The rationale for following the rules doesn’t 
derive from any sort of means-ended calculation, but is simply due to the fact that 
they simply want to high jump.  In being a high jumper one doesn’t restrict the 
modes of efficiency for topping the bar for any greater moral importance, but just 
because they simply want to high jump.203  With respect to morals, obedience to the 
rules makes an action right, but in games it defines the action.204        
 The concept of inefficiency and obedience to the rules proposed construct 
the inner workings of a game.  The end sought in the form of the game cannot simply 
be to win.  There must be an end which is distinct from winning because it is the 
restriction of means to this other end that makes winning possible, and also defines, 
in any given game, what it means to win.205  In defining a game we shall therefore, 
have to take into account these two ends and a third one as well.  First, there is the 
end, which consists simply in a certain state of affairs requiring resolution.  Then, 
when a restriction of means for attaining this end is made with the introduction of 
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rules, we have a second end, winning.  Finally, with the stipulation of what it means 
to win, a third end emerges: the activity of trying to win - that is, playing the 
game.206  It is important to point out that games don’t require us to operate 
inefficiently in our pursuit of victory.207  However, they do require us to operate 
inefficiently in trying to achieve that state of affairs, which counts as winning only 
when it is accomplished according to the rules of the game.208  For the way in which 
those rules function is to prohibit use of the most efficient means for achieving the 
game’s state of affairs.                         
 Suits’ abbreviated definition states, “To play a game is to engage in activity 
directed toward bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means 
permitted by rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in favor of less efficient 
means, and where such rules are accepted just because they make possible such 
activity.”209   
 
5.4 The Elements of Game 
From this definition we get the elements of game for Suits.  The four characteristics 
identified by Suits directly refute Wittgenstein’s family resemblance thesis.  Games 
aren’t characterized by surface similarities, but in fact possess essential conditions 
universal to all games.  These four characteristics proposed by Suits give a precise 
account of the structures forming games.  Suits’ definition suggests games 
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universally contain a task to be achieved, means limited by inefficiency, and rules.  
However, the final characteristic described as the play attitude is the uniting force 
giving meaning to the absurd.  Suits titles the four characteristics as lusory goal, 
lusory means, constitutive rules, and lusory attitude.210   
   The lusory goal is the first element of Suit’s definition.  It refers to the 
specific state of affairs the player is engaged in.  The player attempts to achieve the 
lusory goal in order to complete the end sought within the activity.  For example, 
consider the game of basketball where the lusory goal requires the player’s team to 
score more points than they give up in the allotted period.  However, often sports 
are more nuanced incorporating a series of smaller hurdles that culminate in the 
lusory goal.  Suits describes these hurdles as pre-lusory goals211 which helps to 
clarify how we bring about a specific resolution to our state of affairs.  To continue 
with the basketball example, the pre-lusory goal would be scoring on the opponent’s 
goal by putting the ball through the hoop in any of the three possible point amounts.  
The pre-lusory goal must be fulfilled in a particularly inefficient way in order to 
qualify as a game as asserted by Suits in The Grasshopper. 
 The lusory means are the specific manner outlined in which conduct by the 
player is deemed permissible in achieving the pre-lusory goal.212  In basketball it 
would be much easier to carry the ball directly to the hoop and climb a ladder so 
that you may easily place the ball in the basket, but this opposes the notion of 
inefficiency.  In order to successfully win or play a game, a player must adhere to the 
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means because the lusory goal can’t be achieved independent of the means allowed.  
Otherwise, it ceases to be basketball because inefficient basketball acts such as 
shooting, dribbling, and passing no longer exist.  The completion of pre-lusory goals 
cannot be considered independent of the lusory means used to arrive at the ultimate 
lusory goal.  The means you choose are equally, if not more important than the 
lusory goal itself when ‘playing’ a game.  Adhering to these means allows the game 
to become possible, because it’s not the goal that defines the game, but the 
commitment to doing the activity in the precise manner possible, while reaching 
that goal, that constitutes a game.   
 The third element of a game is the rules.  They exist in three possible forms 
beginning with rules of skill, constitutive rules, and regulative rules.213  Rules of skill 
are not critical to the game, but they do outline how one best goes about doing the 
task in a widely-accepted manner.  Constitutive rules refer to the essential rules like 
court size, number of players, and equipment, forcing players to conform their 
actions to be in accordance with the means.  Regulative rules are a subset of 
constitutive rules that essentially serve to proscribe certain undesirable behaviors 
by carrying a fixed penalty, quite often adding a secondary tactical element beyond 
the rules of skill.  The rules form a constitution presupposing the players will adhere 
to the lusory means, therefore limiting the method of going about achieving the 
lusory goal.  In basketball constitutive rules exist, therefore, to optimize the flow of 
the game through the dimensions of the court, type, and an allotted number of fouls, 
all in addition to the limitation of five players actively participating per squad.  
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Secondary rules exist, like travelling and double dribble, meant to enforce the lusory 
means that circumscribe the game.        
 Last, but certainly not least, in Suits’ theory on games, is the characteristic of 
lusory attitude.  Above all it’s the single most important concept in determining how 
games relate to ‘play.’  With respect to the nature of games, people have an intuitive 
understanding that the goal is the end to the game.  However, they recognize a 
crucial part of ‘game’ is embracing this roundabout method of achieving the goal, 
which runs contrary to the means-ended approach.  Using the basketball example 
again, nothing really prevents the player from travelling with the ball, or using 
unnatural means like climbing a ladder, to score field goals.  Quite simply the player 
embraces the unnecessary difficulty these impediments pose, and as a result, unique 
skills form a way of overcoming these voluntary obstacles.  The player has a 
fundamentally different mentality than a person demonstrating practical judgment.  
By participating with a lusory attitude, the three prior characteristics of Suits’ 
theory merge into playful activity, due to the player’s decision to do the activity for 
itself.  Play is directly attributed to the lusory attitude, which is the result of the 
player’s having the perfect storm of self-delusion and frivolity from their 
perspective. Such an undertaking couldn’t be play without these qualities. 
 
5.5 Tricky Triad 
The definition of a game proposed by Suits is a tremendous building block in the 
tricky triad debate.  Prior to Suits’ definition, Wittgenstein’s family resemblances 
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thesis complicated the nature of our understanding of games.  However, more 
importantly, Suits’ Elements of Games eliminates any lingering ambiguity between 
the relationship of ‘game’ and ‘play.’  Wittgenstein’s family resemblances proposal 
complicates our understanding of how ‘play’ exactly relates to ‘game.’  This 
statement furthers the possibility that ‘play’ and ‘game’ could be conjoined.  One can 
be described as ‘playing’ a ‘game,’ but this simply adapts the defined concept, 
previously explored by Huizinga and Caillois as noun, to actively describing the verb 
on how one properly goes about conducting oneself in a ‘game;’ not describing 
essential qualities of ‘play.’  Suits’ complete definition of the elements of game 
proves that games are structurally designed to create and promote the play 
characteristics outlined by Huizinga and Caillois.  Within a ‘game’ the player must 
accept the lusory means and state of inefficiency, otherwise it becomes impossible 
to discover enhanced intrinsic meaning associated with choosing to perform the 
activity that way.  What is being done can’t be considered ‘play’, but an impractical 
goal oriented endeavor.  It is important to note here that the relationships between 
‘game’ and ‘play’ are not as simple as Suits suggests.  With complete understanding 
of both of Suits’ definitions of ‘play’ and ‘game,’ one can rationally conclude that a 
logical independence exists between the two.  
 Following the completed definitions of ‘play’ and ‘game,’ we can progress to 
the ultimate aim of ‘sport.’  Play carries an indispensable role in the concept of 
game; however, we must maintain a logical distinction to avoid conflation. This 
helps to further clarify the interrelationship within the tricky triad.  The final 
component on the continuum as proposed by Meier, is ‘sport’, and by defining its 
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essence we will finally clarify whether the tricky triad works together in a sort of 
progression as a continuum as alleged by Meier.   
 Subsequent to Suits’ revolutionary definition of a game, he proposed that, 
“Sports are essentially games” with four points of qualification.214  Suits criteria for a 
game goes as follows;  “Sport must contain elements of skill, the skills in question 
must be of a physical nature, the sport must have a sufficient following, and have 
sufficient degree of institutionalization.”215  Outside of these four additional 
requirements Suits’ considered the internal construction of game and sport 
essentially the same.216  However, he also posits at a later point in in time, that sport 
is not a species within the genus game.217  Despite the inconsistency Suits adapts his 
position to move away from viewing game and sport as identical because of critical 
flaws involving the third and fourth point of qualification.  If sport is required to be 
institutionalized, the genesis of an activity cannot come to pass as sport, because not 
everything can be institutionalized.  Sport often is conjured up spontaneously; 
therefore, at some point it passes a threshold to become institutionalized.  Sport is 
better understood along an organizational continuum from relative absence of such 
aspects to that of extreme regulation.218  Second, the degree and duration of ‘the 
following’ associated with the sport in question is a difficult benchmark to set with 
any degree of accuracy.219  Using popularity in this manner to define athletic games 
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from games, is quite arbitrary and unsatisfactory due to variability.220  It would be 
quite arbitrary to mandate a particular temporal period, while considering an 
eternity seems unreasonable due to the reliability of change with successive 
generations.  As a consequence of these errors Suits alters his understanding of the 
tricky triad to evolve the definition of sport and play, while retaining his current 
definition of game.221   
 After Suits renounces his original position (which in fact, is the one that 
Meier ultimately embraces in the end) regarding the similarities of game and sport, 
he uncovers a distinction between types of sport utilizing a Venn Diagram as will be 
shown later in this section.  According to Suits, sport is comprised of two different 
types of competitive events: sports in the form of a refereed contest, and sports in 
the form of a judged performance.222  One is a performance and so requires judges, 
while the other exists as rule-governed interplay involving participants with rules 
enforced by referees to fairly determine the winner.223  For example, consider 
rhythmic gymnastics. Furthermore, differences exist in the types of rules regulating 
judged versus refereed sports.  In refereed sports, the artificial barriers are erected 
just so they can be overcome by the use of rule-governed skills.224  Rules are the 
crux of games because it is the rules of any particular game that generates the skills 
appropriate to that game.225  Conversely, judged events don’t have constitutive 
rules, but rather favor rules of skill.  In the example of rhythmic gymnastics the rules 
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guiding the competition are those of skill, which should be considered akin to a 
method of best practice.   
 The definition of ‘sport’ is more complex than it was when it was first 
envisioned.  Refereed base sports are the same as a game, sharing some basic 
characteristics, but judged performances possess others characteristics that are no 
less different from the structure of ‘game’.  Klaus Meier’s Triad Trickery: Playing 
with Sport and Game serves as a rebuttal to Suits’ article Tricky Triad: Games, Play, 
and Sport, supporting Suits’ original assertion that all sports are games with the 
only qualification being a requirement of physical skill.  He utilizes an Euler 
Diagram, as will be shown later in this section.  His support is linked with a revision 
of an error Suits makes in relation to the idea of the rules governing judged 
performances.  Meier claims that Suits is wrong to suggest that judged performances 
are not subject to rules like referee dependent sport (Meier, p. 20).226  Meier 
recounts Suits’ parable of Ivan and Abdul’s no holds barred fight to the finish in The 
Grasshopper.227  Ivan doesn’t immediately destroy Abdul upon consenting to fight, 
which suggests adherence to a time restriction, which is tantamount to a rule.  This 
parallels with judged performances, and the previous example of rhythmic 
gymnastics, where the competition is guided by a designated routine time limit, 
change over, and order.  However, I feel it is important to turn our attention to the 
aim of the performance, and the possibility that Suits overlooks the importance of 
regulative rules within performance sport.  In the Elements of Sport Suits identifies 
the three types of rules: constitutive, regulative, and skill.  The rules combine to 
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compose the conduct of what one should do in a game; however each one has a 
distinct function.  If some constitutive rules aren’t followed, they carry penalties, 
which serve as our regulative rule.  When reconsidering judged performance sports, 
a player must not only adhere to rules of skill, but also regulative rules that are 
imposed by the judges.  Suits was certainly right about the scarcity of constitutive 
rules in performance sport, as they seldom exist, but that doesn’t necessarily result 
in the exclusion of the performance sport from the category of ‘game.’  Suits grossly 
overlooked regulative rules because if a performer fails to perfectly demonstrate a 
rule of skill, the duty of the judge is to charge the performer with a regulative 
penalty, ultimately reducing their score.  Therefore, it can be argued that judged 
athletic performances are essentially the same as refereed sport because they both 
contain the original criteria of the Elements of Game, simplifying the definition we 
use to define sport.  Therefore, all sports are games with the added qualification of a 
physical skill can be summarized as, “Physical activity that is either essentially 
judged or essentially officiated.  Sports are performances that follow a script and are 
judged.  Sports are games that have a pre-lusory goal, follow rules, and are 
officiated.”228   
I have set out to reach satisfactory definitions for each of play, game, and 
sport from the sport philosophy literature.  If we are in agreement as to the nature 
of definitions we now are equipped with the appropriate provisions to embark on 
answering the question of interrelationship between Play-Sport-Game. 
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5.6 Interrelationships of Tricky Triad 
The definition of ‘game’ and ‘sport’ advanced by Suits suggests that the occurrence 
of ‘play’ isn’t as straightforward as Huizinga and Caillois originally anticipated.  The 
game definition outlined by Suits, presents a distinction between ‘play’ and conduct 
required to make a ‘game’ possible, as being quite different.  One can play a sport by 
simply by following the rules; however, those who ‘play’ sport create their own 
meaning through an altered sense of participation.  Based on the agreed definition 
by Suits, namely, that all ‘sports’ are essentially a specific type of ‘game’ with the 
addition of physical skill, sports are subject to the same to same problem as stated 
above.  The possibility arises that a participant can submit themselves to the rules 
for the sake doing the activity for some end that lies external to the actual activity.  
Players must exhibit autotelicity, similar to that of Johnny, in order for their 
behavior to be truly considered as play; otherwise, it is for something else outside 
the play world.    
 With clear and exact definitions of the components of the tricky triad we can 
now begin to arrange the framework of their interrelationship.  Previously I spoke 
to the Play-Games-Sport continuum proposed by Meier, who initially suggested,  
That considerable agreement within the literature supports the 
concept of a continuum extending from play to games and further to 
sports. The Play-Game-Sport continuum suggests, in general, that 
play activities gradually evolve in game and/or sport with the 
transition characterized by decreasing spontaneity and freedom in 
the direction of progressive formalization and increasing regulation, 
achievement orientation, habituation, and institutionalization.229   
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The continuum model pays heed to the surface understanding of the tricky 
triad; however the logic is fatally flawed.  The model requires ‘play’ to be 
progressively rooted out of ‘game’ to the point of elimination upon reaching ‘sport.’  
While the earlier definition I described as partially correct, in considering ‘game’ 
and ‘sport’ synonymous, the relation with play torpedoes both models.  The 
suggestion that play is more accurately characterized as an attitude or stance 
adopted toward any given activity, such that the presence of this stance renders the 
endeavor one of play and the absence of this attitude disqualifies the activity as one 
of play.230  In sum, game or sport need not be exclusively played, they still allow 
attitudes that are not play to be exhibited within the confines of the game.  To better 
illustrate the relationship of the tricky triad Suits uses a Venn diagram to represent 
the three distinct concepts and their relationships provided below.231 
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Figure 2 Bernard Suits’ Venn Diagram of Tricky Triad.232 
 
1. Primitive Play 
2. Sophisticated Play 
3. Professional Non-Athletic Games 
4. Amateur Performances 
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5. Amateur Sport 
6. Professional Sport 
7. Professional Athletic Performances 
 
With respect to Suits’ Venn diagram, there are couple of points that I take issue 
with; however, the choice of the Venn diagram provides the best method of 
depicting the interrelationship of the tricky triad presented as equal and related 
concepts over that of Meier’s initial continuum model.  The three distinct circles 
overlap one another to show areas of commonality between one, two, or all three 
concepts.  By assembling the Venn diagram in a manner that expresses relative 
equality between the three entities, Suits is claiming here that some sports, namely, 
entirely judged ones are not games.  But, if as argued by Meier, and originally by 
Suits, all sports are in fact games, area 4 and 7 on the diagram can’t logically exist if 
we’ve determined sports exist within the category of games.233  However, the 
strength of Suits’ Venn diagram proves the continuum concept to be less accurate.  
Play either exists or doesn’t within games and sport; a dual nature to going about 
the activity exists when considering Suits’ play definition requirement of 
autotelicity.  The possibility of simply engaging in sport or games for reasons 
external to the sake of doing it simply for itself exists, and for this reason the 
diagram is suitable for representing that relationship.  Thus, the context plays a 
greater role than the content of the activity when participating.234  Meier, using 
Suits’ original definitions, eventually corrected the inaccuracies of the Venn diagram 
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relationship offered by Suits, by revising the scope of sport and repositioning it 
within games using the Euler Diagram below.235   
 
Figure 3 Klaus Meier’s Euler Diagram of the Tricky Triad236  
 
The Euler Diagram more accurately presents the precise relationship of 
sports and games according to the accepted fact that all sports are indeed games 
presented by Suits (original position).  By incorporating the area representing sport 
within the domain of play, the logical inconsistency of the position of (4) and (7) 
within Figure 2. no longer present logical trouble when the “tricky triad” is modified 
into the Euler Diagram.  
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Contrary to the continuum model, Suits’ and Meier’s (later version) 
illustrations successfully demonstrate the complexity of the interrelationship with 
the tricky triad as outlined.237  ‘Play’ exists as the wild card in the framework, either 
present or absent.  In the continuum model, the idea of a range in play is challenged 
by the nature of the more precise sport philosophy definitions of each concept as 
demonstrated by the Venn and Euler Diagrams through plotting their 
interrelationship.  Meier’s diagram (based on Suits’ original definition) is most 
accurate primarily because he eliminates sport as an individual entity distinct from 
game.  Meier depends on Suits’ game definition and uses it to illustrate the 
interrelationship most comprehensively, whereas, Suits does not in his own Venn 
diagram (of his latter definition).  In sum, Meier’s diagram demonstrates that a game 
is any activity involving a pre-lusory goal, lusory means, constitutive rules, and 
lusory attitude. While sports are essentially games requiring physical skill, when 
play represents the stance of intrinsic appreciation of an activity.238   Therefore, I 
have used Suits definition of ‘game’ and ‘play’ to arrive at the conclusion that ‘sport’ 
can be considered as ‘play’ or non-‘play’ depending entirely upon the particular 
attitude adopted by a participant.  However, Suits’ latter definition of sport has been 
rejected.  Suits’ and Meier’s illustration of the interrelationship allows for a clearer 
elucidation of the spirit of play, and has been accepted as a superior account over 
that is provided by the play-game-sport continuum model in philosophy of sport.   
 Although, our understanding of the interrelationship within tricky triads has 
improved, logical imperfections persist in our understanding.  According to 
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Schneider, both Suits and Meier commit a category mistake while defining the tricky 
triad.239  Schneider outlines differences between attitude and activity, which carries 
implications for play.  “A category mistake assumes something belongs to one type, 
or logical category, when really it belongs to another.”240  According to Schneider, 
“Play is [similarly] a mode of performing action rather than a type of action.”241  
Within the two previous definitions for the tricky triad, both Suits and Meier define 
‘playing’ sport through two different methods that don’t correspond sensibly.  Both 
Suits and Meier define sport using the framework Suits constructed for game on a 
conceptual level.  They also agree that the particular participant’s attitudinal 
approach is central to the play element as proven through the example of Johnny 
and the mash potatoes.  Such a way of assigning the play concept avoids the logical 
impediments that confronted Huizinga and Caillois by using compensation 
(Amateur versus Professional) as the deciding factor.  However, “It is not monetary 
rewards that make the difference but rather the change in attitude of the 
participant.”242  By reframing the professional versus amateur designation to one 
that describes the personal reasons for participation, we easily avoid conceptual 
ruts that lie in waiting.  As Suits outlined towards the end of Words on Play, the 
amateur athlete, in strict terms, can pursue victory so compulsively that it 
represents the entire undertaking, transforming something resembling play into 
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something that is exclusively means-ended activity.243  Meier establishes that sports 
and games exist independent of play, but play may deepen the significance of the 
activity for the player.244  But as pointed out by Schneider, “From this account, we 
can deduce that play has nothing to do with the structure of the activity and 
everything to do with the attitude to the player.  However, certain structures may 
encourage some attitudes and discourage others; while logically distinct, the levels 
may be casually interconnected.”245 
 Schneider points out that a conceptual problem exists when plotting play in 
the relationship of game and sport using Venn and Euler diagrams.  We attempt to 
define what something is by comparing its qualities to the essence of the definition 
we have set out.  Most notably the definition of game allows us to identify particular 
activities as being game; however, the criteria used for play is incompatible with the 
diagram method.  Where ‘game’ and ‘sport’ must have the four qualities that define 
the game in addition to that of physical skill, play is circumscribed by the autotelic 
attitude.  The diagram is used to plot the category where a specific activity would fall 
under, however play itself poses a problem.  Schneider claims that, the question, “is 
rugby ‘play’?” in fact does not make any sense because it is not defined by the same 
set of criteria.  The question can only be answered from the micro level of the 
individual, that is to say, the question should be “is that rugby player “playing?”246  A 
game or sport itself doesn’t embody play, people do; so the question in that context 
is unanswerable.  A logical independence exists again proving Meier’s earlier 
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assertion correct with respect to the fact the sport and games need not necessarily 
be ‘played.’247  One must simply submit to the inefficiency of the activity along with 
adhering to the means and rules, to be able to participate in a game.                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
247 Meier, “Triad Trickery: Playing with Sport and Game,” p. 29 
 
104 
 
Chapter 6: The Conclusion 
6.1 Summary  
Throughout the course of this paper I have attempted to lead the reader on a long 
winding odyssey on how the uniquely human concept of sport generates added 
significance that stems from the simple decision to ‘play.’  Sports are important 
because they present a method of finding intrinsic meaning within our own 
embodiment that otherwise is not always available to us through sensible means-
ended conduct.  Sport presents a universal connection that most can relate to when 
it is played sincerely.  This is primarily due the shared collective experience of ‘play’ 
everyone has participated in at one time or another.  Among those ‘playing’ for the 
genuine love of the game, competition, or challenge there is a period that exists 
where ordinary precepts pertaining to purposive and rational human action are 
discarded for the seemingly nonsensical.  All in favor of temporarily living within a 
very specific moment with behavior that can be only described as curious, if 
perceived by an ordinary outsider.  All of one’s being is dedicated to something that 
is meaningless from the perspective of practicality.  The paradoxical behavior of 
such people brings into question the critical element of play.  What other 
phenomenon could possibly explain such actions alien to sensible mature people 
with the benefit of a means-ended outlook?  The tragedy of our day is forming one’s 
understanding of the world solely from a means-ended perspective and applying it 
in cases where it is incompatible e.g. the absurdity of playing games.  This is the 
issue I raise regarding the numerous stakeholders within contemporary sport who 
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can’t see beyond this viewpoint to recognize the importance of play, in and of itself, 
within sport and the deep enduring intrinsic meaning associated with it.                      
Both Huizinga and Caillois firmly establish, through their respective theories, 
that play is an important naturally occurring phenomenon for all sentient beings.  
Their seminal works produce a definition for the concept of play where it was 
previously studied in academic disciplines, which neglected its phenomenological 
nature.  Where Huizinga and Caillois succeed is from the point of isolating the 
unique characteristics of play and inferring what it is that provides its importance.  
Both authors use formal analysis to differentiate play from the other.  Huizinga 
demonstrates incredible breadth proving that elements of play can exist under 
every rock in our social landscape.248  Huizinga’s purpose was to demonstrate how 
the play element spawns culture.  Therefore, his focus wasn’t to ‘narrow’ play to a 
specific application, but to identify its constitution through cross application.  
Identifying similarities allowed Huizinga to begin formulating his definition through 
parallels between play concepts previously thought to be unrelated, for example 
war and philosophy.  Huizinga dedicates a chapter to exploring the characteristics of 
play in each of these cultural forms often thought of as profoundly serious.  By way 
of Huizinga’s analysis, one can better realize that the conduct within the context of 
war in the Middle Ages appears to be governed by the same play framework guiding 
the philosophy first practiced in Hellenic times between the philosopher Socrates 
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and sophist Protagoras.249  Huizinga‘s definition of play provides an exceptional 
foundation to begin refining the significance of the play phenomenon. 
Beginning in the wake of Huizinga, Caillois made his own contribution by 
specifically identifying the types and ways our behavior exists as ‘play.’  The sense of 
structure Caillois provides goes beyond the simple definitional characteristic of 
identifying play.  It provides the next step of classifying it according different 
qualities, demonstrating that a variety of different kinds of conduct can be reduced 
to a similar experience of play.  While Caillois successfully proves the wide range 
within the concept of play, it becomes clear that it can be commonly confused with 
‘game’ as we witness in his chapter on classification.  Often he switches back and 
forth between the different concepts of play and games.  Caillois’ theory also 
contributes to the confusion of these two concepts, leading to a logical 
interdependence, where no such connection necessarily exists.  Play and game are 
separate concepts; however play certainly adds to the meaning of a game for a 
participant.  The evidence of conflation allowed us to better understand the 
metaphysics of sport, and what more precisely, we are truly doing when we engage 
in it.  Without this clarity, a nebulous relationship of the concepts of sport, game, and 
play prevails, preventing us from identifying what specific characteristics become 
important within the practice.  Therefore, each concept must be understood in and 
of itself, and subsequent to this understanding, we can find meaning within the 
practice. 
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 It has been my position in this study that the meaning inherent to this human 
practice stems from the existential nature of play and sport.  We have commonly 
ascribed value from the standpoint of grouping it under the umbrella of play and the 
unique characteristics that define the concept.   This is a result of our overall 
confusion and conflation of these concepts.  Upon flushing out the important and 
unique qualities of play we misunderstand the meaning of the concept through a 
natural relation to work, and the distinguishing characteristics that separate it from 
the ordinary means-ended activity.  I assert that we must overhaul how we attach 
meaning to our participation in sport.  This is better understood through a clear 
understanding of concepts critical to philosophy of sport and appreciation for the 
process, and not solely the output.  This speaks to the inherent value we have in our 
lives that derives from intrinsic choice.  The practice of sport is absurd, but when 
reveling in the absurd in such an intelligent way with rules, prescriptions, and 
proscriptions, a sense of human consciousness remains within the activity.  By 
managing to understand that the activity is utterly meaningless from the standpoint 
of the ordinary, while recognizing the importance of adhering to rules of the activity, 
a unique opportunity presents itself to find meaning through existence, self-
determination, and embodiment in a deeply personal way.   
 Engagement of play and sport can provide us with obvious inherent meaning.  
Through a contrast with the absurd hero Sisyphus, we can better understand that 
despite the obstacle or task, intrinsic meaning presents itself in our endeavors.  The 
difference is the added significance of the intrinsic meaning of play.  The player 
simply experiences a heightened intrinsic meaning because of the unique personal 
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characteristic of the play concept that I acknowledged through the writings of 
Huizinga and Caillois.  
 By recognizing the deeply subjective world of the player with objective 
understanding that tempers the immediacy of their play, its importance becomes 
critical.  Nagel’s concept of the view from nowhere, cited by Feezell, is critical to 
maintaining the partition between two different very real worlds of the player.  
Without playful irony, the absurdity of the play sphere would collapse and what was 
once a unique space becomes no different from the ordinary.   
 From here we are better able to reevaluate the tricky triad and its 
interrelationships.  The philosopher Suits, provides his own changes to the concept 
of play, but his greatest contribution, in my opinion in this regard, is his masterful 
definition of a game’s constitution.  From here it can be realized that sport and 
games are very similar, outside of a principal feature of physical prowess.  The sport 
philosopher Meier demonstrates that Suits was right the first time with his 
definition of sport.  And the sport philosopher, Schneider, demonstrates that both 
Suits and Meier commit a category mistake by trying to put the concept of ‘play’ into 
Venn and Euler Diagrams with sport and game.   However, through Suits’ definition 
of sport it becomes clear that attitude plays a larger role in defining what we do, 
than the absurdity of our actions.  One can fully comply with the structure of 
participating in games without truly playing them.  Obviously, they would have an 
especially impoverished view of the practice, but, nonetheless, such actions remain 
squarely within the realm of possibility.  It is only through combining the play 
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mentality with the action of sport that we can derive true meaning within the 
practice.                        
6.2 Meaning of Play  
The special meaning of play exists in the fact that we exercise choice and self-
determination when determining how we will go about finding our true essence.  It 
means something that we are flawed, inconsistent, and possess an imperfect sense 
of control over ourselves as we go through quotidian life.  However, sport presents 
an opportunity to close the gap between what the mind wants and what the body 
can realize.  Constantly, we can struggle to complete the most insignificant task but, 
when it is accomplished, with this type synchronicity, there are few intrinsic feelings 
that can surmount this experience.  We better discover who we are as individuals, 
our breaking points, and strength not ordinarily exhibited in other arenas.  Who we 
are as players provide a “touchstone,”250 as pointed out by Delattre, to measure the 
quality of ourselves as we continue on each day because the player represents a 
form of ourselves we don’t ordinarily realize.  People aren’t perfect but within the 
crucible that is sport you can better realize who your are and the mettle you consist 
of. 
Through the course of this thesis I have connected how the metaphysics of 
sporting activity corresponds, to the meaning and influence of play.  The ideals of 
sport and the player connect with the existential and reveal that play is one of the 
best ways of discovering intrinsic meaning within our lives.               
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